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Abstract
Today, more than any time in history, our life-styles depend on networked systems,
ranging from power grids to the Internet and social networks. From shopping
online to attending a conference via P2P technologies, the Internet is changing the
way we perform certain tasks, which incentivizes more users to join the network.
This user population growth as well as higher demand for a better access to the
Internet call for its expansion and development, and therefore, fuel the emergence of
new Internet technologies. However, many such technologies fail to get adopted by
their target user population due to various technical or socio-economical problems.
Understanding these (adoption) problems and the factors that play a significant role
in them, not only gives researchers a better insight into the dynamics of Internet
technology adoption, but also provides them with enhanced guidelines for designing
new Internet technologies. The primary motivation of this thesis is, therefore, to
provide researchers and network technology developers with an insight into what
factors are responsible for, or at least correlated with, the success or failure of an
Internet technology. We start by delving deeply into (arguably) the salient adoption problem the Internet has
faced in its 40+ years of existence, and continues to face
for at least a foreseeable future, namely, IPv6 adoption. The study is composed of
an extensive measurement component, in addition to models that capture the roles
of different Internet stakeholders in the adoption of IPv6. Then, we extend it to a
broad set of Internet protocols, and investigate the factors that affect their adoptions.
The findings show performance as the primary factor that not only affected
the adoption of IPv6, but also plays a role in the adoption of any other network data
plane protocol. Moreover, they show how backward compatibility as well as other
factors can affect the adoption of various protocols. The study provides a number
of models and methodologies that can be extended to other similar problems in
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various research areas, such as network technology adoption and design, two-sided
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Today, more than any time in history, our life-styles depend on networked sys-
tems, ranging from power grids to the Internet and social networks. From shopping
online to attending a conference via P2P technologies, the Internet is changing the
way we perform certain tasks, which incentivizes more users to join the network.
This user population growth as well as higher demand for a better access to the
Internet call for its expansion and development, and therefore, fuel the emergence
of new Internet technologies. However, many such technologies fail to get adopted
by their target user population due to various technical or socio-economical strug-
gles. The struggle in some instances is more critical than others. For instance,
adoption of “Google+”, a social network sponsored by Google, is dubbed by many
as an utter failure, however, it only affects a company and its revenue, as opposed
to adoption of IPv6, which is critical for a sustainable expansion of the Internet
and affects its livelihood and future. Understanding these (adoption) problems and
the factors that play a significant role in them, not only gives researchers a better
insight into the dynamics of Internet technology adoption, but also provides them
with enhanced guidelines for designing new Internet technologies. This, results in
lower design cost and more successful adoption instances, which by themselves in-
centivize higher investments in network technologies, and close a positive feedback
loop for development of networks, and therefore, guarantee the sustainability of our
network-dependent life-style. The primary motivation of this thesis is, therefore, to
provide researchers and network technology developers with an insight into what
2
factors are responsible for, or at least correlated with, the success or failure of a
network technology.
The focus of this thesis is predominantly on the Internet, because not only
its rapid expansion1 as well as its association with a vast number of innovative
technologies, e.g., web, P2P technologies, social networks, make it a unique network
on which we are most dependent, but also also it has experienced a large number
of technology adoption instances, and therefore, many more adoption struggles
compared to any other network. We can point to many such struggles in the Internet
such as the adoption of BGPSec, DNSSec, IPSec, SCTP, and man more similar
instances, however, there is one technology that is arguably the salient adoption
problem the Internet has faced in its 40+ years of existence, and continues to face
at least for a foreseeable future, namely, IPv6 adoption. The importance of IPv6
comes from the role it plays in guaranteeing a sustainable expansion of the Internet
in the future, i.e., without IPv6, addressing more than about 4 billion devices is
impossible without creating further issues including performance, scalability, etc.
Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis focuses on providing a deep under-
standing of why and how different factors affected the progress of IPv6 adoption.
In particular, it investigates and reports on the evolution of IPv6 adoption, and the
factors that affected it in the last two decades. The study is composed of two differ-
ent components, namely, measurement and modeling. The extensive measurements
1See http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ for an illustration of the growth
of the Internet user population.
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done by us, and others, show the progress of IPv6 adoption occurred in distinct
phases. They also show the changes in factors affecting IPv6 adoption across var-
ious Internet stakeholders. Finally, through a modeling effort, it demonstrates the
causal relationship between the changes in those factors, and the phases of progress
in IPv6 adoption.
Then, the second chapter investigates a number of future scenarios that can
still derail or speed up the progress of IPv6 adoption. Using game theoretic and
optimization models, the second chapter provides a framework for understanding
the complex interactions between different stakeholders, and the interplay of var-
ious factors in their decision making processes. The models identify two different
scenarios, namely, one where the decisions of some Internet stakeholders can create
an unpredictable ecosystem that can lead to derailing the current progress of IPv6
adoption, and another where a minimal coordination between those stakeholders
create a predictable environment. Then, using the models in the second scenario,
the factors responsible for speeding up the progress of IPv6 adoption are also iden-
tified. While the models are specifically tuned for the IPv6 adoption problem, it
can be used by slight changes for future similar adoption instances.
After understanding the adoption dynamics of IPv6, the factors associated with
them, and the interaction of various stakeholders, in order to expand the breadth
of our study and its applicability, we turn our focus to a broader set of Internet
technologies, and in particular, protocols. Therefore, the third chapter of this the-
4
sis focuses on a broader set of Internet protocols, and investigates, using rigorous
statistical methods, their adoption dynamics. In particular, this chapter explores
the correlation between success or failure of protocols and a number of character-
istics associated with them. The statistical models, e.g., logistic regression, not
only confirm the existence of such correlations, but also quantify the effects of each
one of those factors that play a role in the success or failure of a protocol. This
process is then combined with our engineering intuition, which improves the accu-
racy of the findings, and provides more intuitive and interpretable outcomes. The
methodology developed in this chapter is easily extendable to many other network
technology adoption problems, since it is based on collecting relevant data and using
well-established statistical tools. Each of these chapters are introduced in greater
details in Sections 1.1 to 1.3. The modeling frameworks and methodologies devel-
oped in this dissertation are applicable in many different network settings, and can
motivate further research in the general area of technology adoption.
1.1 Migrating the Internet to IPv6
The Internet has grown far beyond what its original designers anticipated. As
a result and even if the original 32-bit IPv4 addresses may have initially seemed
an inexhaustible resource, we have run out of them2. The need for a solution was
2IANA allocated its last large block of IPv4 addresses in February 2011, and the RIRs are
rapidly following suit, i.e., see http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4 for an up-to-date status.
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recognized early on and led to the standardization of IPv6 in 1995 [24]. IPv6 boasts
a 128-bit address field, and therefore this time a truly inexhaustible address space.
However, even if IPv6 was standardized close to 20 years ago and the IPv4 address
exhaustion is now a reality, the Internet’s migration to IPv6 has been anything
but smooth, to the point that many have at times expressed doubts it would ever
happen.
Migrating the Internet to IPv6 involves two dependent factors, the availability
(and stability) of IPv6 solutions across the Internet infrastructure (from applications
to network components), and the adoption (and use) of those solutions by Internet
stakeholders. In that context, the goals of this study are two-fold. It seeks, using
empirical data gathered over time by us and others, to document and elucidate the
progress of the availability and use of IPv6 across major Internet stakeholders (more
on this below). It also aims to build and validate a simple model that captures some
of the cause and effect relationships that produced major changes in those empirical
observations.
Empirical data suggest an evolution that went through roughly three major
phases since IPv6 was first introduced. The first phase, from IPv6 inception (circa
1995) until about 2009, is best characterized as stagnant, i.e., IPv6 usage experi-
enced little or no growth even if IPv6 as a technology matured considerably during
that time. As we argue later in the chapter, the lack of maturity (compared to
IPv4) of initial versions of IPv6 solutions likely contributed to IPv6 limited early
6
appeal. A second phase followed from 2009 until early 2012, where while IPv6 us-
age remained mostly marginal, there were telltale signs of its emergence. A third
phase started in late 2012, with IPv6 usage slowly accelerating, so that an eventual
migration of the Internet to IPv6 now appears likely, albeit still distant.
The study’s contributions are in documenting and to some extent revealing the
stages IPv6 development and deployment went through across stakeholders. In this
study, we also propose a simple model to explicate the cause and effect relationships
that have and are driving the Internet’s migration to IPv6, and offer qualitative
evidence of the model’s predictive ability.
1.2 Maintaining the Progress of IPv6 Adoption
IPv6 was designed to address the issue of IPv4 address scarcity, and even though
the study in Chapter 2 shows its adoption is accelerating, there are hurdles that
can impede or slow down its progress in the future. Although these hurdles are not
(anymore) of a technical nature, years of technology disparity between IPv4 and
IPv6 caused a marginal adoption of IPv6 across major Internet stakeholders [62],
which in addition to incompatibility of the two technologies forced the use of trans-
lation mechanisms to allow IPv6-only users access to the IPv4-only Internet. These
translation mechanisms are widely used today by ISPs such as CERNET2 in China,
and Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile in the U.S. CERNET2 [90] (an academic net-
work), already had over 400k IPv6-only users in 2009, is expected to reach 3 million
7
by the end of 2015 (see [12, 13]), and uses “IVI”, which translates IPv4 traffic to
IPv6 and vice versa. Similarly, Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile are now primarily
relying on IPv6 addresses for new cell-phone subscribers [77,82], and use “NAT444”
and “464XLAT” as their translation mechanisms, respectively. While necessary for
a transition, the quality degradation those mechanisms introduce [3, 14, 27, 53] re-
duces motivation for the new users to adopt IPv6. This is an instance of hurdles
in front of the progression of IPv6 adoption in the future. Our initial intuition was
that besides the above instance, the distributed structure of the Internet can also
affect the progression of IPv6 adoption. Specifically, the benefit of migrating to
IPv6 depends to a large extent on what others in the Internet do. This is not an
uncommon situation (e.g., see [2] for a related discussion in the context of Internet
security protocols), but uncertainty in the decisions of others can significantly delay
the adoption of a new technology.
A goal of this study is, therefore, to explore and explain strategies that can derail
or speed up the current progress of IPv6 adoption. These strategies require careful
assessments as we are dealing with a highly decentralized system (the Internet). To
better understand the extent to which these strategies can affect IPv6 adoption,
several simple yet representative scenarios and models were developed. The focus
of these models is on the decision making process of independent and decentralized
stakeholders across the Internet, and how those decisions can affect IPv6 adoption.
We acknowledge up-front the many simplifying assumptions these models rely on (a
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necessity in most modeling efforts), and their lack of completeness. However, they
incorporate major aspects of IPv6 adoption decisions, namely, (i) heterogeneity in
the Internet stakeholders making decisions; (ii) a representative sample of available
technology options; and (iii) the dependencies that exist across decisions.
Our findings from these models indicate that independent decision making pro-
cess of ISPs can negatively affect IPv6 adoption. In other words, disagreement
between ISPs on connectivity option offerings, adds uncertainty to the factors that
affect IPv6 adoption decisions of the Internet stakeholders, and makes it hard to
identify winning strategies. As a result of this uncertainty, migration to IPv6 slows
down, or at the very least becomes haphazard. Another finding of the models is
that even minimal coordination among ISPs in offering connectivity options, e.g.,
an Internet-wide consensus on offering IPv6 as one of the connectivity options, can
significantly improve our abilities to identify strategies that hasten the IPv6 mi-
gration process. Although consensus alone is not sufficient, it makes it easier for
the Internet stakeholders to identify winning strategies that can, at the same time,
speed up the migration of the Internet to IPv6.
This study’s contributions are, therefore, two-fold:
(i) It shows how distributed decision making of the Internet stakeholders, in the
presence of competing solutions to the problem of IPv4 address scarcity, can nega-
tively affect identifying winning strategies, and therefore, contribute to the lingering
of the current quandary in IPv6 adoption; and
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(ii) It illustrates how the introduction of limited coordination among ISPs, which
is not in itself enough for IPv6 success, can help determine the impact of different
parameters on IPv6 adoption, and hence, facilitate a smoother migration process.
1.3 Key Factors in Protocol Adoption
Over the past decades, the networking community has learned much about protocol
design, be it in terms of performance, scalability, security, etc., or even in some cases
guaranteeing the correctness of a protocol. However, we know much less about what
controls a protocol’s success in the “real world”. IPv6 is a well-known instance,
which more than two decades after its introduction still struggles to achieve wide
adoption. And there are many other examples. Since 1969 the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) has produced over 3100 standards track Request for Comments
(RFCs). However, in spite of a rigorous vetting process, the odds are little better
than even3 for those protocols to succeed, i.e., be widely adopted by their target
audience.
This raises a number of important questions that, surprisingly, have not been
really addressed by previous research4. In particular, are specific features or prop-
erties more important than others when it comes to influencing a protocol’s suc-
cess? Clearly, technical correctness is important, but we have arguably made much
3A random sample of close to 200 standard tracks RFCs yields a success rate of about 60%.
4Related works are primarily in the realm of “network economics” and therefore with a different
focus than this study.
10
progress in weeding out flawed protocols. External factors such as luck or commer-
cial interests will always be present, but are unlikely to translate into systematic
biases. The question is whether it is possible to carry out a quantitative and statisti-
cally rigorous investigation of protocols and protocol extensions5 to identify factors
with a significant influence on their success (or failure). Additionally, do these fac-
tors vary as a function of a protocol’s type, i.e., the functionality and environment
it targets?
In this study, we apply statistical tools to mine a rich and diverse repository
of protocols, namely standards track RFCs. Standards track RFCs correspond to
protocols that have progressed through rounds of discussions in an IETF Working
Group (WG), and been deemed stable and significant enough to warrant formal
publication. This should, therefore, eliminate technically flawed protocols, as well as
those with little community support. Our goal is to identify statistically significant
features that play an important role in a protocol’s success, with success defined
as “broad-based” adoption among intended users. Note that in identifying such
features, we do not seek to build a prediction tool. Instead, we aim to offer guidance
to protocol designers by highlighting features that may be of particular significance
for different types of protocols.
Our approach is three-prong. We first identify features, which reflect protocol
characteristics that may play a role in their success. Crafting such a list is a some-
5For conciseness and unless otherwise warranted, we use the term protocol to refer to both new
protocols and extensions or new versions of existing protocols.
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what subjective process that borrows on our experience with protocols and protocol
design. Next, we construct a data set that we analyze statistically. This data set is
built from a random sample of standards track RFCs, which are then characterized
in terms of their features as well as labeled as successful or not. Finally, we apply a
well-established classification framework to extract protocol features that show sta-
tistically significant correlation with the success or failure of protocols. The results
are then analyzed to explore their implications, and perform limited validation.The
outcomes of the analysis are both intuitive and surprising. As expected, prediction
accuracy remains in the 70− 80% ranges, as our focus on design features does not
account for the likelihood that other non-technical factors play a role in a proto-
col’s success. The results also confirm that markedly different features affect the
success of protocols of different types. For example, while backward compatibility
plays a critical role in the success of protocol extensions or new versions of existing
protocols, it is of little relevance when it comes to new protocols. Other findings
are, however, less immediately obvious. For example, the most significant factor
contributing to the success of new application and transport layer protocols was the
extent to which they were of benefit to other existing protocols. Similarly, the suc-
cess of network control protocols depended heavily on their ability to realize their
full value once deployed within a domain (as opposed to Internet-wide deployment).
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1.4 Research Publications
The research work presented in this dissertation has been published in several lead-
ing conferences and journals An initial version of our work on migration of IPv6,
titled “Assessing IPv6 Through Web Access - A Measurement Study and Its Find-
ings” (co-authored with Roch Gue´rin, Yiu Lee, and Richard Woundy) [63] was
published in the proceedings of ACM CoNEXT, in Tokyo, Japan, on December 6-9,
2011. A more mature version of the work including measurements from an extended
period of time and a simple model, is accepted for publication as “Migrating the
Internet to IPv6: An Exploration of the When and Why” (co-authored with Roch
Gue´rin) [59] to appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
The work on modeling the future scenarios of IPv6 adoption was first published
as “ Migrating to IPv6 - The Role of Basic Coordination” (co-authored with Roch
Gue´rin) [61] in the proceedings of IFIP Networking, in Trondheim, Norway, on
June 2-4, 2014. The work was extended by including robustness tests, and other
scenarios, and is currently under review in one of the leading networking journals.
Our results on the last topic titled “Why didn’t my (great!) protocol get
adopted?” (co-authored with Constantine Dovrolis and Roch Gue´rin) is currently
under review in a top-tier workshop in networking, and plans for a journal version
of the work is under consideration.
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Chapter 2
Migrating the Internet to IPv6:




The Internet has grown far beyond what its original designers anticipated. As
a result and even if the original 32-bit IPv4 addresses may have initially seemed
an inexhaustible resource, we have run out of them6. The need for a solution was
recognized early on and led to the standardization of IPv6 in 1995 [24]. IPv6 boasts
a 128-bit address field, and therefore this time a truly inexhaustible address space.
However, even if IPv6 was standardized close to 20 years ago and the IPv4 address
exhaustion is now a reality, the Internet’s migration to IPv6 has been anything
but smooth, to the point that many have at times expressed doubts it would ever
happen.
Migrating the Internet to IPv6 involves two dependent factors, the availability
(and stability) of IPv6 solutions across the Internet infrastructure (from applications
to network components), and the adoption (and use) of those solutions by Internet
stakeholders. In that context, the goals of this chapter are two-fold. It seeks, using
empirical data gathered over time by us and others, to document and elucidate the
progress of the availability and use of IPv6 across major Internet stakeholders (more
on this below). It also aims to build and validate a simple model that captures some
of the cause and effect relationships that produced major changes in those empirical
observations.
6IANA allocated its last large block of IPv4 addresses in February 2011, and the RIRs are
rapidly following suit, i.e., see http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4 for an up-to-date status.
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Empirical data suggest an evolution that went through roughly three major
phases since IPv6 was first introduced. The first phase, from IPv6 inception (circa
1995) until about 2009, is best characterized as stagnant, i.e., IPv6 usage experi-
enced little or no growth even if IPv6 as a technology matured considerably during
that time. As we argue later in the chapter, the lack of maturity (compared to
IPv4) of initial versions of IPv6 solutions likely contributed to IPv6 limited early
appeal. A second phase followed from 2009 until early 2012, where while IPv6 us-
age remained mostly marginal, there were telltale signs of its emergence. A third
phase started in late 2012, with IPv6 usage slowly accelerating, so that an eventual
migration of the Internet to IPv6 now appears likely, albeit still distant.
The chapter’s contributions are in documenting and to some extent revealing the
stages IPv6 development and deployment went through across stakeholders. The
work in this chapter also proposes a simple model to explicate the cause and effect
relationships that have and are driving the Internet’s migration to IPv6, and offers
qualitative evidence of the model’s predictive ability.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.7 briefly reviews rele-
vant prior works. Section 2.3 introduces Internet stake-holders and their respective
roles, and reports their use of IPv6 over time. Section 2.4 identifies factors that
likely affect the decisions of Internet stakeholders when it comes to IPv6, and dis-
cusses the impact that changes in these factors may have had. Section 2.5 introduces
a simple model to capture these decision processes, and uses it to qualitatively re-
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produce the trends reported in the data of Section 2.3. Section 2.6 summarizes the
work’s contributions.
2.2 Related Works
The Internet’s transition to IPv6 has been extensively studied, and we only re-
view a sample of representative works, some of which are detailed further in the
next section. Most works fall in either one of two major categories: measurement
(empirical) or modeling (analytical) studies.
Empirical studies have sought to measure IPv6 availability and performance at
both an Internet-wide scale and by focusing on individual components. See for
example [64] for a useful albeit slightly dated overview of the status of IPv6 across
the Internet, or CAIDA [11, 26] that arguably offers one of the more comprehen-
sive repository of related information. Other studies have focused on quantifying
adoption across Autonomous Systems (ASes) [31,68], among end-users [32], and in
Operating Systems (OSes) [18,38]. Performance issues in OSes have been explored
in [58, 91], while investigations aimed at end-to-end performance have compared
IPv4 and IPv6 using metrics such as path delay and packet loss [86, 93]. On the
modeling front, many studies have sought to formulate the IPv6 adoption ques-
tion in the context of an economic framework, in an attempt to capture the many
interacting factors affecting it [30,34,62,79].
Finally, a recent comprehensive investigation of the status and progress of IPv6
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prevalence across the Internet ecosystem was reported in [22]. It measured changes
in address allocation, DNS readiness, routing, etc., and is closest in motivations to
this chapter. An important difference though is in our attempt to develop a model
that can explain some of the measurement results on which we report. In particular,
this chapter combines measurements and models to not only document, but also to
some extent explain the evolution of IPv6 adoption.
2.3 Quantifying the Internet’s Migration to IPv6
This section reports on the evolution of IPv6 “adoption” across Internet stakehold-
ers. Those stakeholders are diverse and adopting IPv6 has very different meanings
across them. Hence, it is useful to first describe them, together with what IPv6
adoption means for each. This is the goal of the next sub-section, which also intro-
duces how IPv6 adoption is measured.
2.3.1 Internet Stakeholders
There has been much interest for what drives the Internet’s growth and the roles
its stakeholders play, e.g., as demonstrated by the creation of an OECD Working
Group on Internet Governance7. A recent report [47] offers an initial taxonomy
of Internet stakeholders that lists, among others, Internet Technology Developers
(ITDs), Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet Content Providers (ICPs), and
7www.oecd.org/internet/broadband/oecdresourcesoninternetgovernance.htm.
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Internet (content) consumers or users. We focus on those, as they are the ma-
jor actors in the Internet’s migration to IPv6, and review their roles and how to
best quantify their migration to IPv6. This is followed by the presentation of mea-
surement data, gathered by others and us, that offers a timeline for the Internet’s
migration to IPv6.
ITDs
They build the technologies behind the Internet, and are, therefore, necessary pre-
cursors to any new Internet capability, including IPv6. In other words, they develop
and release IPv6 versions of their products that are then deployed by other stake-
holders to realize an IPv6 Internet. Hence, measuring IPv6 “adoption” among ITDs
calls for tracking the availability and stability of IPv6-capable products (an IPv6
version may be available, but until it is as stable as its IPv4 counterpart, it is
unlikely to be widely adopted).
ISPs
They provide (Internet) connectivity to users and ICPs through equipment pur-
chased from ITDs. Their adoption of IPv6 is through upgrading their infrastructure
to IPv6, i.e., by supporting routing and forwarding of IPv6 traffic. This adoption
can be measured in a number of different ways, but we rely on two representative
metrics: (i) the number of major transit Autonomous Systems (ASes) that adver-
tise IPv6 capabilities; (ii) the number of (peering) links that exist between them.
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The first offers insight into the overall penetration of IPv6 among ISPs, while the
latter captures the density of IPv6 connectivity (both affect end-to-end connectivity
quality).
ICPs
They own the content that makes up for much of the Internet’s value (to users).
For an ICP, IPv6 adoption implies native IPv6 access to its content. This requires
upgrades to its local infrastructure (or that of its hosting provider), and advertising
IPv6 accessibility (through DNS) to users. Measuring IPv6 accessibility among
ICPs, therefore, calls for tracking which ICPs advertise IPv6 addresses. ICPs,
like ISPs, are, however, diverse in size and popularity, and accounting for those
differences can offer a more accurate perspective on IPv6 adoption. In the next
section, we report measurements of both overall IPv6 adoption by ICPs, as well as
based on their popularity. We use the latter to later estimate the volume of IPv6
traffic contributed by ICPs.
Users
Users derive “value” from accessing content, use of Internet services, etc. They are
mostly oblivious to technology choices, but their expectations for the underlying
technology have implications for IPv6: (i) IPv6 applications should be available
and stable; (ii) IPv6 connectivity should be on par with IPv4; and (iii) content
should be accessible over IPv6. Hence, using IPv6 addresses for new users once IPv4
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addresses have been exhausted, is feasible only if those conditions are met. Because
a comprehensive census of IPv6 users is not feasible, we measure IPv6 “adoption”
among users using statistical estimates based on representative samples.
2.3.2 Assessing the Internet’s Migration to IPv6
This section presents empirical data on the evolution of IPv6 adoption among ITDs,
ISPs, ICPs, and users. As mentioned before, the data points to a three-phase
adoption:
Phase I [1995− 2009]: Stagnation;
Phase II [2009− 2011]: Emergence;
Phase III [2011−): Acceleration.
We provide next evidence in support of this conclusion.
ITDs
There are many technologies involved in delivering Internet connectivity. We focus
on IPv6 progress for a representative subset, namely, routers/switches, Operating
Systems (OSes), and applications.
Router/Switch Manufacturers Support for IPv6 came in early in routers/switches,
e.g., between 1998 to 2000, when Juniper introduced its first series of IPv6-capable
routers [46]. Cisco quickly followed suit by introducing IPv6 capability in CISCO
IOS routers and L3 switches. Early availability, however, did not equate qual-
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ity/stability. In particular, a 2007 study [93] showed that IPv6 forwarding plane
lagging behind its IPv4 counterpart, with routers/switches the primary culprits.
Those early stability problems are, however, now over and a study we conducted in
2011 [63] showed that the IPv6 and IPv4 forwarding planes now perform similarly.
OS Developers Support for IPv6 appeared first in Linux 2.1.8 (in 1996), but
remained in experimental status until around 2005. Microsoft Windows 2000 did
support IPv6, but not by default, and Microsoft did not ship Windows OSes with
default IPv6 support until 2007 (Windows Vista). Apple introduced IPv6 by default
in 2003 in Mac OS X v10.3. As with routers, early IPv6 offerings were plagued by
problems, e.g., [91]. Performance, however, improved over time across all operating
systems, e.g., [58] showed in 2009 that IPv6 and IPv4 performance were on par
in Microsoft Windows Vista and in Linux Ubuntu. As of today, IPv6 is available
in nearly all operating systems [43] (Windows Phone 8 added support for IPv6 in
2011, and Android with its Lollipop release) with few if any remaining performance
problems [38].
Internet Application A comprehensive list of IPv6 capable applications (with
their IPv6 launch date/version) is available at [41,42]. In this subsection, we rely on
a set of popular applications, to gauge the evolution of applications’ IPv6 readiness.
Table 2.1 gives the launch date of the IPv6 version of applications in this target set
(or NA when an IPv6 version is not yet available). The table indicates a slow but
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steady progress in adding IPv6 support from the late 1990’s until today. However,
as with routers, switches and OSes, IPv6 support was not always synonymous with
stability or quality. Consequently, many applications initially shipped with IPv6
disabled by default, and some still do (e.g., VMware vSphere ESX/ESXi had IPv6
disabled by default until v. 5.1 [85]).
In summary, after a relatively slow start, IPv6 support is now readily available
across all major Internet technologies. Maturity and stability of those offerings
is, however, relatively recent. The lack of stability in early versions may partially
explain some of the findings on which we report next, namely, a relative stagnation
of IPv6 adoption among other Internet stake-holders (ISPs, ICPs, and users) in
IPv6 early years.
IPv6 status across ISPs
As ISPs upgrade their network to IPv6 and advertise it to other ISPs, they af-
fect overall IPv6 Internet connectivity. To measure this impact, we focus on IPv6
adoption among “major transit ISPs” that carry a large share of Internet traffic8.
CAIDA has been conducting such a study since 2005 [11], tracking all major IPv4
and IPv6 transit ASes and their peering links. We summarize in Table 2.2 some
of CAIDA’s more salient results, which illustrates the evolution of IPv6 adoption
among major transit ASes.
8Recent reports have identified shifts in Internet traffic patterns [51], but those ISPs continue
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Table 2.1: IPv6 launch of key Internet applications (from [41,42,56,85])
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# of # of % of # of # of # of IPv6
ASes ASes ASes Peering Peering Peering per 100
(IPv4) (IPv6) (IPv6) Sessns. (IPv4) Sessns. (IPv6) IPv4 Peering
2009 23k 515 2.24% 50k 1904 3.8
2011 29k 1183 4.08% 78k 2738 3.51
2013 34k 2419 7.11% 109k 8881 8.15
Table 2.2: Internet AS core Evolution (Data from CAIDA’s website [11]).
CAIDA’s data show that by 2009 barely 500 or just over 2% of the major transit
ASes were IPv6 capable. The next two years, 2009−2011, hint at the beginning of a
transition with a doubling of this number to 1183, with IPv6 penetration itself also
nearly doubling. This trend continued, and the number of IPv6 capable transit ASes
again doubled by late 2013. This indicates that in spite of a slow start, a critical
threshold seems to have been crossed, with IPv6 deployment now expanding rapidly.
The progression of the number of IPv6 peering links/sessions (a measure of IPv6
connectivity) displays a similar trend (last three columns of Table 2.2). Ripe Labs
carried out a similar study [68] recording all ASes (from transit to edge, including
content ISPs) advertising at least one IPv6 route, which yielded results consistent
with the three-phase progression of CAIDA’s more focused data.
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ICPs IPv6 Accessibility
Internet content is accessible (to users) in many different forms, but websites host
the vast majority of it. Tracking IPv6 accessibility across public websites, therefore,
offers a reasonable estimate of IPv6 deployment among content providers. Early
(circa 2004) estimates [86] reported that barely 1, 000 out of more than 51 millions
websites (see http://goo.gl/Ydql7U) were IPv6 accessible, i.e., a negligible frac-
tion (less than 0.001%). This confirms the limited appeal of IPv6 in those initial
years.
In 2009, we started an independent set of measurements, tracking IPv6 acces-
sibility of Alexa’s top one million websites9 (see http://www.alexa.com). Alexa’s
top one million websites span a broad range of categories (commercial, educa-
tional, entertainment, etc.) and popularity, and offer a representative sample of
the now more than 1 billion websites in existence (as of September 2014 based on
www.internetlivestats.com). The methodology behind our measurements is doc-
umented in [63], but essentially consists of three steps: (i) issuing DNS queries
for websites in the list; (ii) downloading the homepage of websites for which DNS
returned both “A” and “AAAA” records, i.e., websites with IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses10; (iii) time-stamping and recording the results in a database.
9The list now includes over 8 millions websites, because of churn in Alexa’s top 1 million list
and additions from local DNS caches.
10Websites accessible only over IPv6 represent only a minute fraction of monitored websites,
and are, therefore, ignored in the measurements.
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Figure 2.1: IPv6 Adoption among Alexa’s Top 1M Websites.
Figure 2.2: IPv6 Adoption among the Top 100, Top 1k, and Top 1M Websites.
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Fig. 2.1 reports the results of our measurements, showing that while IPv6 adop-
tion remained low in the 2009 − 2011 period, it improved on its earlier marginal
adoption (it grew from essentially 0 to about 0.2% by early 2011). A momentous
change appears to have occurred in 2011, likely spurred by the “official” exhaustion
of IANA’s IPv4 address pool in February 2011, and by a greater awareness con-
tributed by events such as the World IPv6 Day (http://www.worldipv6day.org)
that produced a large albeit somewhat transient increase in mid 2011. The tempo-
rary gains of the World IPv6 Day were eventually cemented after the World IPv6
Launch in mid 2012 (http://www.worldipv6launch.org/), with IPv6 adoption
transitioning to a faster pace (approximately doubling every year), and reaching a
penetration close to 5% by mid 2014. This roughly mirrors the trend observed for
ISPs.
Fig. 2.2 expands the view of Fig. 2.1, showing IPv6 accessibility as a function of
a website’s popularity, i.e., it reports separately IPv6 accessibility for the top 100,
top 1000 and top 1 million websites. The figure clearly illustrates that more popular
websites are more likely to be IPv6 accessible (by as much as a factor 6), though
all categories follow similar trends.
Estimating the IPv6 User Base
Evaluating the extent to which users have IPv6 connectivity is a challenging prob-
lem, not only because of the size of the user population, but also because of the
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diversity in how that connectivity is used when available, e.g., many OSes are con-
figured to prefer IPv4 over IPv6 when both are available [80]. Furthermore, changes
usually happen at a coarse granularity, e.g., because of an ISP’s conversion11, large
scale monitoring is important. For that purpose, we rely on data gathered by
Google. Google sites see billions of accesses daily from across the globe, and can
monitor how many were over IPv6 [32]. Google’s data may under-sample regions
such as China where popular alternatives to its services exist, but it nevertheless
offers a reasonable assessment of the evolution of the IPv6 user base worldwide.
Google’s data show that by 2009, barely 0.2% of users were accessing its services
over IPv6. This grew to 0.3% over the next two years, after which growth started
to accelerate to reach 3% by early 2014 (a ten-fold increase). This roughly matches
the three phase growth pattern of ISPs and ICPs.
The next section seeks to develop a better understanding for the reasons behind
this three-phase adoption pattern.
2.4 IPv6 Ecosystem
Explicating the evolution of the Internet’s migration to IPv6 calls for a better
understanding of what drives Internet stake-holders to adopt IPv6 in the first place.
In other words, what factors affect those decisions and how? Users are mostly
11See for example, T-Mobile’s recent announcement [77] to use only IPv6 for users with Android
4.4 KitKat phones.
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oblivious to what technology is used to connect them to the Internet, i.e., IPv4 or
IPv6, and their choices are typically dependent on decisions made by ITDs, ISPs
and ICPs. As a result, we focus on these latter three stake-holders.
All three are complex decision makers, so that modeling their decisions un-
avoidably involves simplifications. A common approach is to rely on an objective or
utility function that (rational) decision makers then seek to maximize [54]. Utility
functions vary across stake-holders, but typically incorporate factors such as cost
and quality of a product, its value, how widely it is adopted, etc. In this section, we
first posit a number of factors and their influence on the decisions of ITDs, ISPs,
and ICPs. We then identify and characterize changes in those factors, and establish
how they may have produced the three-phase migration process documented in the
previous section.
2.4.1 Decision Factors
In identifying factors and their role in the (IPv6) “adoption” decisions of ITDs,
ISPs and ICPs, we consider each separately.
ITDs
They develop IPv6 versions of their products based on expectations of demand for
those products. As alluded in Section 2.3.2, this demand, however, depends on
the availability of those very same products (IPv4 versions were, at least initially,
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a perfect substitute); in the process creating a chicken-and-egg problem that may
have contributed to their slow maturation. The problem is compounded by the
fact that availability alone is not sufficient. Because IPv4 serves as a benchmark to
which IPv6 is compared, the quality and stability of IPv6 products affects demand;
in particular by ICPs whose revenues are affected by the quality of users’ experience.
Formalizing the impact of those dependencies in the context of a simple model is
the subject of Section 2.5.
ISPs
The growing scarcity of IPv4 addresses is the primary motivation for an ISP to
adopt IPv6. This, however, calls for upgrading its network and operational prac-
tices. This one time cost can result in an ISP deferring such a decision, especially
since alternatives exist for dealing with IPv4 address shortages. Those include pri-
vate IPv4 addresses, or securing additional public IPv4 addresses, e.g., through
“markets” that are emerging to meet such a demand (see Section 2.4.2).
Large-scale use of private IPv4 addresses has many drawbacks, including the
need to deploy “Carrier Grade NATs” (CGNs) or NAT444, and more importantly
offers little long-term strategic value (see [45] for a related discussion). Purchasing
(new) public IPv4 addresses avoids those problems, but has a cost of its own. One
that will likely increase as the supply of available public IPv4 addresses dwindles.
This is in part why ISPs such as CERNET2 in China, and Verizon Wireless and
31
T-Mobile in the U.S., opted to start using IPv6. CERNET2 [90] (an academic
network), already had over 400k IPv6-only users in 2009, and is expected to reach
3 millions by the end of 2015 (see [12,13]). Similarly, Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile
are now primarily relying on IPv6 addresses for new cell-phone subscribers [77,82].
An ISP’s decision to adopt IPv6 and start assigning IPv6 addresses to its users
will, therefore, largely depend on the tension between upgrade costs and the cost of
procuring new public IPv4 addresses once it exhausts its current pool. The simple
model of Section 2.5 seeks to capture this tension.
It should be noted though that adopting IPv6 has implications beyond allocating
IPv6 addresses to new users. In particular, users not assigned a public IPv4 address
need some form of “translation” service to connect to the public IPv4 Internet. For
example, CERNET2 and T-Mobile use IPv6-to-IPv4 translation mechanisms called
IVI and 464XLAT, respectively. Verizon Wireless, on the other hand, assigns both
private IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to users. A user’s IPv6 address is used to connect
to IPv6 accessible destinations, while connectivity to the public IPv4 Internet is
through the user’s private address and NAT444 devices. Translation requirements
will, however, eventually disappear once the Internet is fully IPv6 accessible. Hence,
while ISPs will incur translation costs after exhausting their public IPv4 addresses,




They are mostly oblivious to how their content is accessed, i.e., whether over IPv4
or IPv6, and mostly concerned with how access may affect their revenue. ICPs
derive revenues from users in a variety of ways [67], from a user’s number of clicks
(e.g., Google), to a user’s purchasing a good (e.g., Amazon), to how much time
a user spends consuming content (e.g., Facebook), etc. In spite of their diversity,
these have in common that they are impacted by connectivity quality (see [9] for an
investigation with a “per-click” revenue model, and [75] for a general study of how a
site’s “speed” affects conversion rates). Performance of IPv6 users is well known to
be negatively affected by translation [3, 14, 27, 53], which can then provide an ICP
with the motivation to become IPv6 accessible. This is, however, predicated on
IPv6 connectivity being of sufficient quality, and on the number of IPv6-only users
being high enough to justify the change and its cost. The former is well illustrated
by the “white-listing” [33] that content providers such as Google rely on to control
IPv6 connectivity to their content (IPv6 connectivity is allowed only if its quality
is on par with that of IPv4). The latter depends on both the expected growth in
the number of IPv6 users and on the cost of upgrading the ICP’s infrastructure
and operational procedure (or those of its hosting provider) to IPv6. This cost is
usually proportional to the size of the ICP.
There are clearly other factors that can contribute to an ICP’s decision to be-
come IPv6 accessible, e.g., greater ease of obtaining Provider Independent (PI) IPv6
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Impact on Utility
Factors ↗ ISPs ICPs ITDs
Demand for IPv6 Tech. 7 7 ⊕
IPv4 Address Cost 	 7 7
Upgrade Costs 	 	 7
Translation Cost ∼ 7 7
# of IPv6 Users ∼ ⊕ ∼
# of IPv6 ICPs ⊕ ∼ ∼
IPv6 Quality 7 ⊕ 7
Table 2.3: Effect of increases in IPv6 adoption factors.
addresses [49]. However, improving connectivity quality, and consequently revenue,
is one factor common to all ICPs. In contrast, the ability to, say, obtain a PI IPv6
address is attractive only to ICPs without a PI IPv4 address, and this is a rela-
tively small fraction (a random sample of 100 websites in the top 1 million showed
that about 80% of them already had a PI IPv4 address12). Hence, we expect IPv6
connectivity quality and its impact on ICPs revenue to be a major factor in their
decision to become IPv6 accessible.
12An exhaustive census is challenging, as accurately verifying address ownership is complex and
involves manually cross-checking multiple databases.
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2.4.2 Ecosystem changes
Section 2.3 documented changes over time in IPv6 adoption by Internet stakehold-
ers, while Section 4.2 put forward factors that are likely to shape their decisions. In
this section, we investigate the extent to which those factors evolved over time, and
whether those changes can explain the three phases migration pattern we observed.
As a prelude to this investigation and as a means to classify the impact of the
different factors identified in Section 4.2, we record them in Table 2.3 according
to how increases (↗) in each one of them affect decision makers. The (⊕) and
(	) symbols in the “Effect” columns indicate whether an increase has a positive or
negative impact on a stakeholder’s utility. Conversely, an 7 symbol signals that the
factor does not affect the stakeholder’s utility, while a ∼ indicates that the factor
should only have a marginal impact.
Demand for IPv6 Technologies
It is not easy to quantify the demand for IPv6 technologies. However, anecdo-
tal evidence points to near-zero demand in 1995 (the birth of IPv6), followed by
government mandates providing some initial impetus in the late 90’s, before the
looming scarcity of IPv4 addresses became more apparent and resulted in a sub-
stantial demand today, e.g., in 2014 Verizon Wireless proceeded to allocate IPv6
addresses to over 45% of its approximately 90 millions subscribers [83]. ITDs likely
responded to or anticipated those changes, which may explain the progressive mat-
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uration of IPv6 core technologies in the 1990’s, followed by the rapid expansion of
IPv6 enabled end-devices and applications in the late 2000’s.
IPv4 Address Cost
As mentioned earlier, although IANA and most RIRs have run out of IPv4 address
blocks to allocate, this does not mean that all public IPv4 addresses are in use.
As a matter of fact, recent studies [23, 35] estimate that of the order of about 30%
of all public IPv4 addresses are still available (unused). As a result, mechanisms,
e.g., markets, have started to appear to facilitate access to those unused addresses.
Specifically, following the purchase in 2011 of Nortel’s IPv4 addresses by Microsoft
at a cost of about $11 per address (http://goo.gl/ZIA18), several private markets
have emerged such as the IPv4 Market Group (http://ipv4marketgroup.com) and
IPv4Auctions.com. Both report a steady stream of IPv4 addresses sales at prices
ranging from $7 to $18 in 2013 and 2014, with larger blocks, i.e., /15’s and /16’s
having typically lower per address costs than smaller blocks13.
The role of those markets in facilitating the exchange of IPv4 addresses notwith-
standing, their biggest impact is likely to signal to ISPs that IPv4 addresses are not
free anymore. As Table 2.3 highlights, having to potentially pay for what used to
be a free resource, negatively affects an ISP’s utility. Expectations that acquiring
new IPv4 addresses will become increasingly expensive contribute to strengthening
the benefits of adopting IPv6. In the process enticing more ISPs to embark on such
13See http://goo.gl/pDI4gQ, http://goo.gl/udHdW1, and http://goo.gl/4RCEw9.
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an upgrade, and increasing demand for IPv6 products.
Infrastructure Upgrade Costs
They affect both ISPs and ICPs, and we review each in turn.
ISPs: Upgrading an ISP’s infrastructure to support IPv6 is no small task. It
involves equipment and operational upgrades, and as can be expected [44], has
a cost proportional to the size and complexity of the ISP’s infrastructure. As
recommended in [44], this cost can be spread out and incurred as part of routine
upgrade cycles. Any such upgrade will, however, be more challenging/costly if IPv6
versions of new products are not stable. This introduces a direct coupling between
the demand for IPv6 products and the level of investment (by ITDs) required to
ensure a sufficient quality. In particular, low investments in IPv6 products because
of low anticipated demand result in lower quality products, which in turn drives
demand down. Strategic investment decisions by ITDs (or spurred by government
mandates) can break the cycle, and trigger an initial demand that will in turn fuel
further investment and growth in product quality and eventually demand. The
model we introduce in Section 2.5 incorporates this coupling.
ICPs: Upgrading an ICP’s infrastructure to IPv6 shares many of the same
features as upgrading an ISP’s infrastructure to IPv6. As with ISPs, labor and
hardware/software equipment costs are the main contributors [44]. Those costs will
typically increase with the size of the ICP’s infrastructure, and decrease as IPv6
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technology matures. Hence, ICPs face a trade-off between delaying upgrading until
the technology is sufficiently stable, but then having to perform such an upgrade for
a larger user-base. Section 2.5 introduces a simple model that reflects this trade-off
and mimics an ICP’s decision process.
Translation Costs
As discussed earlier, translation is required for both IPv6 and private IPv4 ad-
dresses to allow connectivity to the public IPv4 Internet, and in particular ICPs.
Translation costs are roughly proportional to the volume of traffic that needs to
be translated [37]. For IPv6, this depends on both the number of IPv6 users and
the number and popularity of ICPs requiring translation (not IPv6 accessible). We
performed a crude assessment of the evolution of translation traffic based on esti-
mates for the growth in the number of IPv6 users of Verizon Wireless14 (available
at http://labs.apnic.net/ipv6-measurement/AS/2/2/3/9/4/) and the number
and popularity of ICPs that are not IPv6 accessible. The results are in Fig. 2.3 and
assume that all users request the same amount of traffic and that traffic originates
from ICPs in proportion to their popularity according to an exponential distribu-
tion. The latter is based on measurements for the top 10, 000 websites of a large
cable provider. The figure shows that even if recent growth in the number of IPv6-
only users contributed to an increase in translation traffic, this volume remains
small (less than 0.4% of Verizon Wireless traffic).
14Those users do not have a public IPv4 address.
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Figure 2.3: Approximating translated traffic volume over time.
Number of IPv6 Users
As seen in the Google data of Section 2.3, the number of IPv6 users has been
steadily increasing. This trend is echoed in various public reports pointing to faster
IPv6 growth, especially in the Asia-Pacific region15, where the scarcity of public
IPv4 addresses is more severe. A larger IPv6 user base should entice more ICPs
to become IPv6 accessible, which would reduce the need for translation and in
the process make IPv6 more attractive to ISPs. These positive dependencies could
trigger a virtuous adoption spiral of the kind we appear to be witnessing in what we
termed Phase III. The model of Section 2.5 offers a possible option for formalizing
15See http://goo.gl/ZG41fU for a recent announcement.
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these dependencies.
Number of IPv6-accessible ICPs
The measurement results of Section 2.3 indicate a strong recent uptick in the number
of IPv6 accessible ICPs, which, if the trend persist, should further strengthen IPv6
momentum.
IPv6 connectivity quality
This is the last and possibly most important change in the IPv6 ecosystem, namely,
the coming of age of IPv6 when it comes to technology maturity. This maturity
manifests itself through improvements in both stability and performance; improve-
ments that finally allowed IPv6 to be on par with IPv4 and in some cases better.
We illustrate this in Fig. 2.4 that reports the results of a measurement study started
in 2009 (see [63] for details). The study compares IPv6 and IPv4 web download
speeds from several vantage points for a large set of websites (including all top 1M
sites).
Fig. 2.4 displays the fraction of web servers accessible over both IPv6 and IPv4
for which IPv6 download speed was equal or higher than with IPv4. The figure
shows a period of continuous improvement until early 2013, at which point IPv6 was
at least as good as IPv4 80% of the time. The remaining gap of 20% is comparable
to that of IPv4, which also lags behind IPv6 for 20% of websites. This is not
unexpected when comparing two (now) mostly equivalent technologies, where small
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configuration or load differences can easily result in one outperforming the other.
This hypothesis was confirmed by verifying that when IPv6 is strictly better than
IPv4, and vice-versa, the difference in performance is small, i.e., in the range 5 to
10 kbytes/sec.
The results demonstrate that, as of 2013, IPv6 and IPv4 are mostly on par
performance-wise. This is undoubtedly the product of improvements made by ITDs.
However and interestingly, greater technology maturity is not the only factor behind
this change; adoption decisions by ISPs also played a role. In order to better
understand this, it is useful to take a closer look at the different components that
affect connectivity quality. Specifically, end-to-end connectivity is affected by both
end-systems and the network. We proceed next to drill down on each one of these
components.
Figure 2.4: Fraction of websites with better or equal IPv6 connectivity than IPv4.
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End-Systems IPv6 support in end-systems is dominated by decisions from ITDs16,
i.e., when do they first make it available and how quickly do they ensure that the
new software is stable. As reported in Section 2.3.2, IPv6 availability was uneven
across OSes with support and improvement across many platforms happening as
late as 2009. However, IPv6 support is now stable across all OSes, so that their
IPv6 performance is not of concern anymore.
The Network IPv6 network performance depends on both routers’ ability to
forward IPv6 packets (the data plane), as well as how the path connecting the
source to the destination is chosen (the control plane). The first factor depends
solely on decisions by ITDs, i.e., their ability to release product upgrades that
deliver identical packet forwarding performance in IPv6 and IPv4. The second
factor, although clearly affected by ITDs’ decisions, is also, as we discuss below,
very much dependent on adoption decisions made by ISPs.
There is no denying that IPv6 data plane performance was initially lagging
behind that of IPv4. A 2007 study [93] identified a non-trivial gap in end-to-end
performance between IPv6 and IPv4, and assigned most of the blame to the data
plane. In 2009, we started an independent measurement study aimed at assessing
the extent to which this performance gap still existed, and what contributed the
most to it. The study involved multiple sources (clients) geographically distributed
16Even if the option to turn IPv6 on or off is available, most users will stay with the manufac-
turer’s default configuration.
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around the world, which continuously probed over a million websites (including
Alexa’s top 1M) for IPv6 access, and for those accessible over both IPv4 and IPv6
measured their respective web access performance (download speeds). The study’s
methodology and its results are documented in [63]. It showed that while as of
2011 a performance gap remained, it was not anymore caused by differences in
data plane performance. Instead, control plane factors, i.e., routing and peering
decisions affecting IPv6 paths, were the main contributors.
The determination that the IPv6 data plane had finally achieved performance
parity, and conversely that control plane factors were now primarily responsible
for the remaining performance gap, involved a two step analysis of the available
measurement data:
Top 100k Sites Top 1M Sites
Same Path Destinations 94% 90%
Diff. Paths Destinations 70% 74%
Table 2.4: IPv6 better or equal to IPv4 between 2009-2011.
Step 1 focused on instances of end-to-end connectivity for which IPv4 and IPv6
made identical control plane decisions, i.e., IPv4 and IPv6 packets are forwarded
along the same path. This isolates the data plane as the main source of (network)
performance differences. The first row of Table 2.4 shows nearly identical perfor-
mance, which established the parity of the IPv4 and IPv6 data planes.
Step 2 considered cases for which IPv4 and IPv6 control plane decisions differ,
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i.e., the paths chosen by IPv4 and IPv6 routing are different. Note that such differ-
ences arise primarily because of adoption (or lack thereof) decisions. Specifically,
instead of following the optimized IPv4 path, IPv6 routing is required to detour (or
tunnel) around routing domains (ISPs) that have either not deployed IPv6 or opted
not to establish IPv6 peering sessions with their neighbors. Measurement data
revealed that a substantial performance gap remained in those cases (second row
of Table 2.4). Hence, establishing the control plane, and therefore ISP’s adoption
decisions, as the main contributor to IPv6 continuing performance lag.
In summary, as of 2011 IPv6 was finally on par with IPv4 technology-wise, but
while the performance gap had narrowed, it had not disappeared. Limited adoption
(among ISPs), which IPv6 initial technical immaturity had contributed to, was still
preventing parity by forcing the use of less efficient paths. In other words, IPv6 low
adoption among ISPs was potentially slowing its future adoption by perpetuating
a performance gap with IPv4. This begged the question of what adoption level was
needed to, if not close, at least make this gap less perceptible.
As Fig. 2.4 demonstrates, the performance gap between IPv4 and IPv6 had
essentially disappeared by 2013 (they perform identically about 80% of the time,
and each outperforms the other for the remaining 20%). The hypothesis is that
IPv6 adoption, at least in the core of the Internet, is now sufficient to ensure that
even when IPv4 and IPv6 control plane decisions differ, the detours IPv6 may
still have to make now have a negligible impact. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 offer data in
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support of this conclusion. Table 2.5 shows that after 2011, not only did destinations
with identical IPv4 and IPv6 paths continue to see mostly comparable performance
(confirming performance parity), an increasing number of destinations accessible
over different IPv6 and IPv4 paths also achieved parity. As Table 2.6 suggests, this
can be attributed to “shorter detours” taken by IPv6 paths because of the greater
density of IPv6 ISPs in the core of the Internet17. To further assess the extent to
which this was the case, we compared IPv6 (AS) path lengths in 2011 and 2012 and
found that 72% of them experienced a decrease. This is in contrast to only 18% of
IPv4 paths experiencing a decrease in the same period.
In summary, by 2013 IPv6 had achieved not only technology, but also perfor-
mance parity with IPv4. The latter was primarily due to higher IPv6 adoption in
the core of the Internet. This contributed to decreasing the number and length
of IPv6 detours, which all but eliminated differences in latency between IPv6 and
IPv4 paths.
Top 100K Sites Top 1M Sites
Same Path Destinations 100% 94%
Diff. Paths Destinations 79% 84%
Table 2.5: IPv6 better or equal to IPv4 after 2011.
Another category of websites of potential interest is that of sites associated with
17This is consistent with CAIDA’s measurements summarized in Table 2.2), which showed an
increased density of IPv6 in the core of the Internet.
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Table 2.6: Transit ASes sampled in our measurements.
different destination ASes in IPv6 and IPv4, with Table 2.7 showing how they fared
performance-wise. There are various possible reasons for why IPv6 and IPv4 queries
for a given webpage are sent to different locations. One of them is clearly the use of
CDNs, especially since until 2012 very few CDN providers offered IPv6 services18.
We were, however, only able to confirm the use of CDNs for a few such websites19.
Irrespective of the reason behind the difference in destination ASes for IPv6 and
IPv4 queries, Table 2.7 shows that IPv6 performance also improved for this category
of sites. This is again likely due to the overall improvement in IPv6 connectivity
that made IPv6 paths more efficient.
In summary, IPv6 lack of technology maturity initially resulted in poor perfor-
mance, which likely contributed to slow adoption by ISPs. This in turn ensured a
18See http://www.cdn-advisor.com/tag/ipv6/.
19Among 100 randomly chosen such websites, only 42 could be directly linked with a well-
known CDN service provider such as Akamai, Bitgravity, NTT, Bankinform, Cloudflare, Edgecast,
Amazon, Google, Softlayer, Tata, etc. For the remaining 58 sites, we could neither confirm a well-
known CDN service, nor could we rule out reliance on a lesser-known CDN provider, or some form
of load-balancing mechanism.
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Top 100K Sites Top 1M Sites
2009–2011 67% 70%
2012–Present 80% 78%
Table 2.7: IPv6 better or equal to IPv4 – Different ASes.
Phase I Phase II Phase III
Demand for Moderate Large Very
IPv6 Tech. Large
IPv4 Address 7 Anticipated Realized
Scarcity
Infrastructure Large Moderate Moderate
Upgrade Cost
Translation 7 Low Marginally
Cost Increasing
# of IPv6 Users Negligible Marginal Moderate
# of IPv6 Negligible Marginal Moderate
Accessible ICPs
Quality of IPv6 Low Moderate High
Connections
Migration Stagnant Emerging Accelerating
Status
Table 2.8: Evolution of Key IPv6 Adoption Factors.
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persisting performance gap, even after IPv6 achieved technology parity. This ap-
pears to have changed around early 2012, with IPv6 finally achieving parity with
IPv4. This should, hopefully, further facilitate IPv6 continuing adoption.
2.4.3 Closing the loop: positing cause and effect relation-
ships
In this last section, we attempt to correlate the three phases of the IPv6 migra-
tion observed in Section 2.3.2 to changes in the different factors identified in the
previous section. For convenience, we summarize those changes in Table 2.8. The
discussion is followed in Section 2.5 by the introduction of a simple model based on
the parameters of Table 2.8. The model seeks to capture the complex dependen-
cies and interactions that exist between those parameters, and their effect on IPv6
adoption. The primary purpose is to qualitatively validate the causal relationships
posited in this section between IPv6 adoption and changes in these parameters. In
other words, given an evolution of the IPv6 ecosystem similar to that of Table 2.8,
does the model yield changes in IPv6 adoption consistent with the observations of
Section 2.3.2. The goal is not to precisely reproduce those changes, but instead to
confirm the cause and effect intuition we articulate next.
During Phase I (before 2009), IPv4 addresses were still plentiful and their ex-
haustion far in the future, so that demand for IPv6 products was low and limited
mainly to a few forward-looking ISPs. This ensured a relatively low initial in-
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vestment in the development of IPv6 technology by ITDs. This combination of
limited investment and few users to test the technology likely contributed to the
slow maturation of IPv6 technology. This in turn kept demand low and perpetu-
ated the status quo. There does not appear to have been a single landmark event
that triggered a sudden increase in ITDs investment in the development of IPv6
technologies. Instead a slow but steady rise in awareness, in part brought about by
various government programs and mandates, e.g., see [16], resulted in IPv6 tech-
nologies being progressively brought on par with their IPv4 counterpart. By 2009,
most key Internet technologies supported IPv6, and did so at a level of quality and
stability close to that of IPv4.
Near technology parity paved the way for the emergence of IPv6 that started
in Phase II. Technical parity was, however, by itself not sufficient to trigger mass
adoption. IPv6 still lacked a strong enough incentive to overcome the adoption cost
it imposed on both ISPs and ICPs. This remaining barrier was further strengthened
by dependencies between stake-holders (ICPs had little incentive to become IPv6
accessible without a critical mass of IPv6 users, and ISPs where hesitant to invest
in assigning IPv6 addresses, when IPv4 addresses were still available and most
ICPs were not reachable over IPv6). Hence, in spite of the growing incentive to
adopt IPv6 created by the steady decline in free IPv4 addresses and the steady
improvements in quality of IPv6, progress remained slow.
Several additional changes were required to usher in the acceleration of IPv6
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adoption that started in Phase III. The reality of IPv4 address scarcity finally settled
in with IANA’s allocation of its last block, and a sequence of high-profile events such
as World IPv6 Day and World IPv6 Launch further contributed to this realization.
In addition, the level of IPv6 adoption in the core of the Internet eventually reached
sufficient critical mass to ensure that the quality of IPv6 connectivity was on par
with that of IPv4, i.e., did not involve costly detours. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1,
this together with the potential for faster growth in the IPv6 user base, made it
easier for ICPs to opt to become IPv6 accessible. Anecdotally, this can also be seen
when comparing the results of the IPv6 World Day (June 2011) and IPv6 World
Launch (June 2012) (see again Fig. 2.1). Many ICPs that “tried” IPv6 during IPv6
World Day reverted to IPv4 after the event, while most IPv6 trials converted to
permanent status after IPv6 World Launch.
In the next section, we introduce a simple model that seeks to connect more
formally the parameters and patterns identified in Table 2.8, to the three-phase
adoption of Section 2.3.
2.5 A Simple Validation
Our goal in this section is to offer a simple validation of the causal relationships
put forward in the previous section, between changes in the IPv6 ecosystem and
the IPv6 adoption pattern observed in Section 2.3.2. For that purpose, we develop
a model that captures interactions between the parameters of Table 2.8 and their
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effect on IPv6 adoption. We then vary those parameters in a manner consistent
with Table 2.8, and show that the model produces changes in IPv6 adoption that
are qualitatively consistent with the trends reported in Section 2.3.2. We note that
a more quantitative validation is challenging, as accurately estimating both exact
changes in the parameters of Table 2.8 and their relative weights in the model is at
best difficult. Furthermore, the specialized nature of the IPv6 adoption problem and
its many unique parameters, make it unlikely that a more precise model formulation
would have value that extends to other settings and technology adoption scenarios.
Instead, the model developed in this section offers a broad confirmation of the
cause-and-effect relationships posited in the previous section. As we illustrate later,
it also enables coarse “what-if” investigations, which can highlight the importance
of certain parameters in keeping IPv6 adoption on track.
2.5.1 Model Overview
The model involves the three major decision makers of Section 2.4, namely, ITDs,
ISPs, and ICPs. As alluded to earlier, users are mostly passive, with their “adop-
tion” of IPv6 largely a consequence of decisions made by others. Stake-holder’s
decisions to adopt IPv6 are based on utility functions that depend on multiple fac-
tors, including the adoption decisions of other stake-holders. Stake-holders revisit
their decisions at discrete epochs indexed by i, to account for changes in both the
Internet ecosystem, e.g., a decrease in the number of available public IPv4 addresses
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or growth in the number of Internet users (the Internet user-base is assumed to grow
at a rate of q in each epoch), and the decisions of other stake-holders. For simplic-
ity and in keeping with practice, IPv6 adoption decisions are assumed irreversible
(once their cost has been incurred, there is little benefit to reverting). ITDs, ISPs
and ICPs boast different utility functions, and the model allows for heterogeneity
in their individual decisions as well as limited competition (for ITDs).
In the next two sub-sections, we introduce expressions for the utility functions
of ITDs, ISPs, and ICPs, and describe their use in making adoption decisions. The
last sub-section is devoted to evaluating the model’s outcome under combinations
of parameters that mimic the progression of Table 2.8.
2.5.2 Utility Functions
ITDs
They provide Internet technologies to other Internet stakeholders, and their (IPv6)
utility is expressed through the revenues they generate from their IPv6 products.
Revenues depend on demand (i.e., market size), which grows as more of the Internet
migrates to IPv6. ITDs periodically assess the IPv6 market size, denoted as M(i)
at epoch i. For simplicity, the model does not endogenize the relationship between
M(i) and the level of ISP and ICP adoption. Instead, it couples them exogenously
in its numerical evaluation.
ITDs are split into different market segments, e.g., router vendors, OS devel-
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opers, etc., with segment j assigned a share δj of the overall IPv6 market. Within
a segment, the model includes two ITDs to incorporate the effect of competition.
Market size determines whether an ITD invests in developing IPv6 technology and
at what level, with a higher level of investment corresponding to higher product
quality. Quality varies between 0 and 1, with 0 denoting no product offering and
1 corresponding to parity with IPv4. The quality of an ITD’s offering determines
how it shares its market segment with its competitor. A product’s quality is taken
to be proportional to the ITD’s cumulative investment in developing the product,





where Qj(i) denotes the quality of the IPv6 offering of a type j ITD at epoch i, and
cl is the investment it made at epoch l. The model further assumes that at each
epoch, type j ITDs play a best response game with their competitor to determine







δjM(i)− ci , (2.5.2)
where QComp.j (i) is the quality of the ITD’s competitor(s) at epoch i. Eq. (2.5.2)
captures the relationship between the investment an ITD makes and the revenue
it generates from investing in its IPv6 products. Note that Eq. (2.5.2) assumes a
symmetric decision process by the competing ITDs in market segment j. This is
for analytical tractability, but does not qualitatively affect the model’s outcome.
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Eq. (2.5.2) also reflects two important aspects of IPv6 investments by ITDs:
(i) they are demand-driven, i.e., if there is no demand (M(i) ∼ 0), ITDs do not
invest in IPv6, and conversely, growth in M(i) fuels investments; and (ii) improving
the quality of IPv6 products is in part driven by competition (see Section 2.5.3 for
details).
ISPs
They all eventually need IPv6 to grow (keep adding new users), but upgrading
their network to IPv6 involves a cost. The cost of upgrading an ISP’s network
depends on network size and a “unit” upgrade cost. The size of an ISP’s network
is assumed proportional to its user base, and the model allows heterogeneity in ISP
sizes. The initial size of the mth ISP is denoted as nm, and is assumed to grow at
a constant rate of q. The unit cost of upgrading an ISP’s network to IPv6 depends
on the availability and quality of versions of ITDs’ technologies. For simplicity,
the model assumes that it is inversely proportional to a parameter φ(i) that tracks
availability and quality of IPv6 technologies at epoch i (φ(i) takes values in [0, 1]
–see Eq. (2.5.9)– with 0 corresponding to no IPv6 version of a technology, and 1 to
quality that is on par with that of IPv4). The need to acquire more IPv4 addresses
is the main counterpart to the cost of upgrading one’s network, and the model
assumes that ISPs are heterogeneous in the number of IPv4 addresses they initially
have at their disposal. This number is denoted as km for ISP m at epoch 0
20. The
20In Section 2.5.4, both nm and km are taken to be uniform in [0, 1].
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unit cost of new IPv4 addresses is chosen21 to be “quadratic” to reflect the fact
that as they grow scarce, their price is likely to increase. The cumulative cost of
deferring upgrading to IPv6 until epoch i for the mth ISP is, therefore, of the form:
CUpm (i) =
user base︷ ︸︸ ︷
nm(1 + iq)





IPv4 address acquisition cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
C4((i− 1)nmq − km)2+ .
The first term is the cost of upgrading an infrastructure that has grown to a size of
nm(1 + iq) by epoch i given a unit upgrade cost of 1/φ(i), while C4((i − 1)nmq −
km)
2
+ = C4 max(0, ((i− 1)nmq− km))2 denotes the cost of acquiring IPv4 addresses
up to epoch i−1 (this cost remains 0 until the ISP exhausts its initial IPv4 address
pool of size km). Note that nm(1 + iq) grows over time, while 1/φ(i) decreases as
IPv6 technology improves. As we shall see in Section 2.5.3, ISPs seek to identify
the epoch that minimizes upgrade costs.
Once an ISP has upgraded its network to IPv6, the model assumes that it al-
locates both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses to new users until it runs out of the latter.
Once this happens, it must either purchase more IPv4 addresses, or deploy trans-
lation devices to enable IPv6-only users to access the IPv4 Internet. The choice is
based on cost, and given that, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, translation costs are
expected to decline, we further simplify the model by assuming that translation
is the solution of choice. The main impact of this assumption is in increasing the
21Other cost functions can be chosen, e.g., constant, and while they quantitatively affect the
results, the outcome remains qualitatively similar.
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number of IPv6-only users, which, as we shall see next, positively influences ICPs’
decisions.
ICPs
Their revenue depends in part on the quality with which they deliver content to
users. ICPs that are not IPv6 accessible must rely on translation to access IPv6
users, and as the IPv6 user base grows, the connectivity impairment this imposes on
those users (see again [3, 14, 27, 53]) translates into an increasing penalty (revenue
loss). ICPs, therefore, weigh this loss against the cost of becoming IPv6 accessible.
This cost is primarily an infrastructure upgrade cost, similar in nature to that of
ISPs. It depends on the availability of IPv6 technologies and the size of the ICP’s
infrastructure. An ICP decides to become IPv6 accessible once the cost of doing
so is lower than the revenue gain the change will generate. This decision process is
captured in Eq. (2.5.4) that also incorporates heterogeneity among ICPs based on
their popularity. More popular ICPs are assumed to generate higher revenues from
their users, as well as incur lower upgrade costs (because of economies of scale). As
expected, this translates into more popular ICPs adopting earlier, consistent with
Fig. 2.2.
∆ICP (i) =N6(i)βa6(i) (2.5.4)
−[N46(i)βα(i)) + Sinfra(i) (2− β) 1
φ(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
per user upgrade cost
]
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∆ICP (i) measures the impact on the ICP’s revenue of becoming IPv6 accessible
at epoch i. The first term in Eq. (2.5.4) represents the gain associated with IPv6
accessibility, with N6(i) the size of the IPv6 user base at epoch i, β the ICP’s
popularity factor22, and a6(i) the per user revenue gain from native IPv6 connectiv-
ity at epoch i (it increases over time as the quality of IPv6 technology improves).
Note that Eq. (2.5.4) highlights that when native IPv6 connectivity is (quality-wise)
worse than what is achievable through translation devices, i.e., a6(i) ≤ 0, ICPs have
little to no incentives to become IPv6 accessible (because ∆ICP (i) ≤ 0). The second
term in Eq. (2.5.4) includes both a potential revenue loss associated with becoming
IPv6 accessible, and the cost of upgrading the ICP’s infrastructure to IPv6.
The potential revenue loss associated with IPv6 accessibility is in the term
N46(i)βα(i). It accounts for the fact that dual-stack users (there are N46(i) of
them) often access IPv6 accessible ICPs over IPv6 and not IPv4, which may result
in lower connectivity quality. This is captured through α(i) that denotes the per
user revenue loss at epoch i from IPv6 connectivity relative to IPv4 connectivity.
Finally, the term Sinfra(i)(2− β)/φ(i) represents the ICP’s IPv6 upgrade cost that
is proportional to the size of its infrastructure at epoch i, Sinfra(i), and, as with
ISPs, is inversely proportional to the availability and quality of IPv6 technology as
measured through φ(i). The factor (2− β) reflects the economies of scale assumed
available to more popular ICPs (the least popular ICPs have upgrade costs twice
22β is distributed in [0, 1], with 1 the highest popularity.
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those of more popular ICPs).
An ICP re-evaluates the benefit of IPv6 accessibility at each epoch to account
for changes in the parameters of Eq. (2.5.4). Factors that contribute to making
IPv6 more attractive include growth in N6(i), the number of IPv6-only users and
improvements in IPv6 quality that contribute to both increasing a6(i), the revenue
gain afforded by native connectivity for IPv6-only users, and decreasing the revenue
loss α(i) incurred for dual-stack users. On the other hand, the ICP’s infrastructure
size, Sinfra(i), keeps growing, so that upgrade costs may increase, unless the per
user cost of upgrading to IPv6, (2− β)/φ(i), decreases commensurately. To assess
the overall impact of these different factors, the model uses the following expressions
for estimating changes in a6(i) and α(i):
a6(i) ∼ φ(i)µ(i) + ICDN (2.5.5)
α(i) ∼ 1− φ(i)µ(i) + ICDN
2
, (2.5.6)
where as in Eq. (2.5.3), φ(i) measures the availability and quality of IPv6 technology,
ICDN denotes the fraction of CDN providers that support IPv6 (they can have a
strong impact on IPv6 quality), and the product φ(i)µ(i) captures the dual impact
of the network data plane (φ(i)) and control plane (µ(i)) on the overall quality of
IPv6. As discussed earlier, φ(i) depends on the maturity of IPv6 technology, while
µ(i) increases as more ISPs adopt IPv6 (detours around IPv4 only islands become
shorter). In the next section, we formalize the evolution of those parameters and
their dependencies.
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2.5.3 Decision Mechanisms & Solution Method
This section reviews the decision process that the utility functions of the previous
section give rise to under the assumption that stake-holders make decisions that
maximize their utility. In other words, they are rational.
ITDs
ITDs’ decisions are when and how much to invest in developing IPv6 versions of
their technology. We assume that to be viable IPv6 products must meet a min-
imum quality threshold 0 < Qmin < 1. Hence, an ITD of type j first invests in
IPv6 at epoch i if the cost (of meeting the minimum quality threshold) is less than
the revenue potential of the IPv6 market, as defined in Eq. (2.5.2). The decision,
therefore, depends on the ITD’s type, δj, the estimated size of the IPv6 market at
epoch i, M(i) (an increasing quantity), and the quality of its competitor’s tech-
nology at epoch i, QComp.j (i). The first two parameters are exogenous, while the
ITD needs to anticipate QComp.j (i). Given the assumption of a symmetric decision
process (more on this below), the two competing ITDs (in market segment j) make




This competition between ITDs can be modeled as a best response game at each
epoch. The actions of both players are their level of investment in IPv6, which in
turns determines the quality of their offering. Both players in segment j account
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for the decision process of their competitor, so that their best response decisions
are in the form of an investment that at epoch i yields a cumulative quality Qj(i)
for their technology of the form
Qj(i) =
√
QComp.j (i)M(i)δj −QComp.j (i). (2.5.7)
The symmetric nature of the two ITD competitors in market segment j produces
a Nash equilibrium where they split the market equally with a cumulative quality








Note that Eq. (2.5.8) implies that ITDs wont invest in IPv6 versions of their tech-
nologies until δjM(i) > 2Qmin, i.e., the IPv6 market size exceeds a certain thresh-
old. Conversely, as M(i) grows, ITDs’ technologies investment ultimately results in
(quality) parity between the IPv4 and IPv6 versions of their technologies. This in
turn yields the following expression for the parameter φ(i) that measures the overall










where the summation is over all market segments.
ISPs
An ISP’s goal is to find the epoch at which the cumulative cost of upgrading its
network to IPv6 is “minimal.” Upgrade costs are initially high because IPv6 quality,
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φ(i), is low. As per Eq. (2.5.3), this leads some ISPs to defer upgrading until quality
improves23. As IPv6 quality improves and approaches parity with IPv4, upgrade
costs eventually increase driven by growth in an ISP’s user base. Predicting the
exact crossover point is complex, and our goal is not to offer precise guidelines.
Instead we seek to capture the inherent tension between those two factors in an
ISP’s decision. For that purpose, we assume that ISPs rely on a myopic decision
process and simply evaluate whether the rate of increase of upgrade costs is higher
than in the previous period, and upgrade as soon as it is.
In other words, the mth ISP adopts IPv6 at epoch im if C
Up
m (im)−CUpm (im−1) >
CUpm (im− 1)−CUpm (im− 2), where CUpm (i) is as per Eq. (2.5.3). With ISPs decisions
known, the fraction µ(i) of ISPs that have upgraded to IPv6 by epoch i can then be
readily obtained, and therefore used to determine its impact on IPv6 connectivity
quality as per Eqs. (2.5.5) and (2.5.6). Recall that the latter play a role in ICPs
decisions, and capturing those interactions is one of the model’s goals.
Once an ISP has upgraded its network to IPv6, it faces another decision, namely,
how to continue to provide new users with access to the IPv4 Internet. This is an
easy decision as long as the ISP still has IPv4 addresses, i.e., until epoch i = km/nmq
for the mth ISP, as new users can be assigned both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. Once
an ISP runs out of IPv4 addresses, it must then decide between acquiring more
IPv4 addresses and deploying translation mechanisms, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
23Heterogeneity in decisions arises from differences in both ISPs’ size and in the number of IPv4
addresses they own.
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The model can be readily adapted to allow for such a decision, i.e., select the
lowest cost option. However, we assume in our evaluation (Section 2.5.4) that ISPs
are “strategic” and opt to handle IPv4 connectivity (for new IPv6 users) solely
through translation mechanisms. The primary motivation is, as outlined next, that
this offers additional incentives for ICPs to become IPv6 accessible earlier. Hence,
hastening the Internet’s migration to IPv6, and ultimately lowering ISPs costs.
ICPs
An ICP’s goal is to maximize the revenue it derives from having Internet users.
For that purpose, it re-evaluates ∆ICP (i) (Eq. (2.5.4)) at every epoch, and becomes
IPv6 accessible at the first epoch i for which ∆ICP (i) > 0. Under the assumption
that ICPs’ popularity β is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], this yields the following
expression for the fraction γ6(i) of ICPs that are IPv6 accessible at epoch i:
γ6(i) =
N6(i)a6(i)−N46(i)α(i)− Sinfra(i)/φ(i)
N6(i)a6(i)−N46(i)α(i) + Sinfra(i)/φ(i) (2.5.10)
Using Eq. (2.5.10), it is easy to establish the following intuitive statements that
highlight the dependencies that exist between ICPs decisions and those of ISPs and
ITDs:
The fraction of ICPs natively accessible over IPv6 increases as either the num-
ber of IPv6 users increases, or the quality of IPv6 increases (a6(i) increases, α(i)
decreases). In addition, once the IPv6 user base is large enough (N6(i)a6(i) >
N46(i)α(i)), decreases in upgrade costs contribute to increasing the number of IPv6
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accessible ICPs. Conversely, increases in the number of dual-stack users can delay
increases in the number of IPv6 accessible ICPs.
2.5.4 Model’s Evaluation
The goal of this section is to explore the extent to which the progression of IPv6
adoption documented in Section 2.3 can be reproduced using the arguably stylized
model that was just presented. For that purpose, we consider “configurations”
associated with different combinations of the model’s exogenous parameters, and
characterize the evolution of IPv6 “adoption” across stake-holders as the Internet’s
user base increases. Specifically, we numerically evaluate the model’s outcome for
three different sets of exogenous parameters that mimic the three right columns of
Table 2.8.
The first configuration emulates IPv6 early years. Demand for IPv6 versions
of Internet technologies was initially non-existent (M(i) ∼ 0). As a result, de-
velopment incentives were low even in segments with large market shares δj, e.g.,
router and OS vendors. The outcome predicted by Eq. (2.5.9) is marginal avail-
ability of IPv6 technologies, i.e., φ(i) ∼ 0, and consequently large upgrade costs
(1/φ(i)  0). This in turn translates into a negligible fraction of ISPs upgrading
their network to IPv6 (µ(i) ∼ 0) and similarly very few ICPs opting to become IPv6
accessible (γ6(i) ∼ 0). Initiatives aimed at promoting support for IPv6, e.g., gov-
ernment mandates, helped change the situation and create some early demand for
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IPv6 technologies (M(i) > 0) even in the absence of a real driver (the exhaustion
of IPv4 addresses was still far away). This in turn triggered some initial invest-
ments on the part of ITDs (see again Eq. (2.5.9)), so that early releases of IPv6
products became available, i.e., φ(i) > 0. This lowered upgrade costs (1/φ(i)), but
ultimately had little effect on IPv6 adoption by either ISPs or ICPs, i.e., µ(i) & 0,
and γ6(i) & 0. The reason, consistent with Eqs. (2.5.3) and (2.5.4), is that while
demand for and availability of IPv6 technology improved, IPv6 quality/stability
remained below that of IPv4 (a6(i) was still small), endemic problems continued
to plague dual-stack users (α(i) stayed large), and IPv4 address exhaustion was
nowhere near.
The second configuration seeks to capture the second phase of IPv6 adoption
in Section 2.3. During that phase, demand for IPv6 products increased to a point
where most of the ITDs supported IPv6 in their products at a level of stabil-
ity/quality on par with that of IPv4, i.e., φ(i) ∼ 1. This was sufficient to incen-
tivize some ISPs to adopt IPv6. Most of those ISPs, however, still owned IPv4
addresses, so that new users were primarily dual-stack (as opposed to IPv6 only),
i.e., N6(i) stayed small while N46(i) grew. This offered little motivation for ICPs to
consider becoming IPv6 accessible, especially since IPv6 connectivity quality was
still lagging behind IPv4 (because many ISPs had not yet upgraded to IPv6). This
is consistent with Eq. (2.5.10) that produces only small increases in γ6(i) under
those configurations.
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The third configuration maps to phase three of Section 2.3. ISPs are increasingly
running out of IPv4 addresses, and because IPv6 technology is stable and on par
with IPv4, upgrading to IPv6 now makes sense for many of them. The larger number
of IPv6 ISPs together with the greater availability of IPv6 versions of services such
as CDNs result in IPv6 connectivity quality being now equals that of IPv4 (a6(i) ∼ 1
and α(i) ∼ 0). This eliminates the quality penalty that IPv6 users suffer compared
to IPv4 users. When combined with a growing number of IPv6-only users (N6(i)),
this is enough to entice an increasingly large number of ICPs to become IPv6
accessible; a phenomenon that Eq. (2.5.10) again captures.



























Figure 2.5: Model-driven evolution of ICPs’ IPv6 adoption.
IPv6 adoption under those three configurations is shown in Fig. 2.5 for ICPs.
The outcome is qualitatively similar to Fig. 2.1. This is obviously no “proof” of the
model’s validity. However, it offers a level of validation for the causal relationships
put forward in Section 4.2, connecting changes in the IPv6 ecosystem and the
observed evolution of IPv6 adoption.
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The model can also be used for coarse “what-if” analyses exploring the potential
impact of changes in the IPv6 ecosystem. Those can prove useful to avoid missteps,
which could, if not derail, at least slow-down IPv6 adoption and in the process
increase its overall cost. We illustrate this through a simple example that considers
a scenario where ISPs that migrated to IPv6 proceed to sell their IPv4 addresses
on open markets such as those of Section 2.4.2. The resulting influx of new IPv4
addresses would likely stabilize or even reduce IPv4 address costs. This would in
turn make it easier for ISPs that have not yet migrated to IPv6 to defer this decision;
in the process slowing down the growth of the IPv6 user base. The impact on ICPs
is less clear since while there would be fewer IPv6 users overall, more of those users
would now be IPv6-only. The former is a disincentive to becoming IPv6 accessible,
while the latter acts as an incentive.
The model offers the opportunity to investigate the impact of such a change, with
the results shown in Fig. 2.6. The figure demonstrates that the slower growth in the
total number of IPv6 users produced by lower acquisition costs for IPv4 addresses
is the dominant factor. It results in ICPs delaying their decision to become IPv6
accessible. The insight that emerges from this “what-if” scenario is that although
ISPs that migrated to IPv6 stand to derive short-term benefits from selling their
IPv4 addresses, those benefits are likely to be offset by the higher cost they will
incur from the Internet’s slower migration to IPv6, e.g., through higher translation
costs.
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Figure 2.6: Impact of lower IPv4 address acquisition costs when ISPs sell their IPv4
addresses after migrating to IPv6.
2.6 Conclusion
This work in this chapter reports on measurements capturing the evolution of IPv6
adoption across Internet stakeholders, and identifies factors likely to have influenced
adoption decisions. It posits, and to some extent documents, changes in those fac-
tors as possible causes for transitions in IPv6 adoption patterns observed in the
measurements. We also develop a simple model connecting those changes to their
impact on IPv6 adoption, and use it to qualitatively validate its hypotheses. The
investigation identifies the coupling between low initial demand for IPv6 products
and their lower quality compared to their IPv4 counterpart as an important contrib-
utor to IPv6 early adoption challenges. In particular, it appears largely responsible
for the initial reluctance of service and content providers to adopt IPv6, which in
turn deterred users and contributed to prolonging the Internet’s migration to IPv6.
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Chapter 3




IANA announced in February 2011 that the free pool of IPv4 addresses is depleted,
and even if IPv4 addresses scarcity has not yet materialized everywhere, we are
slowly but surely headed in that direction. IPv6 was designed to address this
issue, and even though our study presented in Chapter 2 shows its adoption is
accelerating, there are hurdles that can impede or slow down its progress in the
future. Although these hurdles are not (anymore) of a technical nature, years of
technology disparity between IPv4 and IPv6 caused a marginal adoption of IPv6
across major Internet stakeholders [62], which in addition to incompatibility of the
two technologies forced the use of translation mechanisms to allow IPv6-only users
access to the IPv4-only Internet. These translation mechanisms are widely used
today by ISPs such as CERNET2 in China, and Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile
in the U.S. CERNET2 [90] (an academic network), already had over 400k IPv6-
only users in 2009, is expected to reach 3 million by the end of 2015 (see [12, 13]),
and uses “IVI”, which translates IPv4 traffic to IPv6 and vice versa. Similarly,
Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile are now primarily relying on IPv6 addresses for
new cell-phone subscribers [77, 82], and use “NAT444” and “464XLAT” as their
translation mechanisms, respectively. While necessary for a transition, the quality
degradation those mechanisms introduce [3, 14, 27, 53] reduces motivation for the
new users to adopt IPv6. This is an instance of hurdles in front of the progression
of IPv6 adoption in the future. Our initial intuition was that besides the above
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instance, the distributed structure of the Internet can also affect the progression
of IPv6 adoption. Specifically, the benefit of migrating to IPv6 depends to a large
extent on what others in the Internet do. This is not an uncommon situation (e.g.,
see [2] for a related discussion in the context of Internet security protocols), but
uncertainty in the decisions of others can significantly delay the adoption of a new
technology.
A goal of this chapter is, therefore, to explore and explain strategies that can
derail or speed up the current progress of IPv6 adoption. These strategies require
careful assessments as we are dealing with a highly decentralized system (the In-
ternet). To better understand the extent to which these strategies can affect IPv6
adoption, several simple yet representative scenarios and models were developed.
The focus of these models is on the decision making process of independent and
decentralized stakeholders across the Internet, and how those decisions can affect
IPv6 adoption. We acknowledge up-front the many simplifying assumptions these
models rely on (a necessity in most modeling efforts), and their lack of complete-
ness. However, they incorporate major aspects of IPv6 adoption decisions, namely,
(i) heterogeneity in the Internet stakeholders making decisions; (ii) a representative
sample of available technology options; and (iii) the dependencies that exist across
decisions.
Our findings from these models indicate that independent decision making pro-
cess of ISPs can negatively affect IPv6 adoption. In other words, disagreement
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between ISPs on connectivity option offerings, adds uncertainty to the factors that
affect IPv6 adoption decisions of the Internet stakeholders, and makes it hard to
identify winning strategies. As a result of this uncertainty, migration to IPv6 slows
down, or at the very least becomes haphazard. Another finding of the models is
that even minimal coordination among ISPs in offering connectivity options, e.g.,
an Internet-wide consensus on offering IPv6 as one of the connectivity options, can
significantly improve our abilities to identify strategies that hasten the IPv6 mi-
gration process. Although consensus alone is not sufficient, it makes it easier for
the Internet stakeholders to identify winning strategies that can, at the same time,
speed up the migration of the Internet to IPv6.
The chapter’s contributions are, therefore, two-fold:
(i) It shows how distributed decision making of the Internet stakeholders, in the
presence of competing solutions to the problem of IPv4 address scarcity, can nega-
tively affect identifying winning strategies, and therefore, contribute to the lingering
of the current quandary in IPv6 adoption; and
(ii) It illustrates how the introduction of limited coordination among ISPs, which
is not in itself enough for IPv6 success, can help determine the impact of different
parameters on IPv6 adoption, and hence, facilitate a smoother migration process.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the frame-
work of the problem, including the Internet stakeholders, connectivity options, and
scenarios. Sections 3.3 introduces the models in two categories of disagreement and
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consensus. Section 3.4 and 4.5 explore the outcome of the models with a certain set
of assumptions, and provide the key findings. Section 3.6 investigates the robust-
ness of our findings to different modeling assumptions and extensions. Section 3.7
briefly reviews related works, with Section 4.7 summarizing the chapter’s findings
and recommendations.
3.2 Problem Framework
There are many factors that arguably affect the adoption of IPv6, and any (tractable)
model is unlikely to account for all of them and their variations across stakeholders.
Our models operate within a certain framework, and this section specifies the out-
line of that framework by introducing the Internet stakeholders, their connectivity
options, the inter-dependencies between their decisions, and the scenarios in which
they interact.
3.2.1 Internet stakeholders
We distinguish between three types of Internet stake-holders: Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), Internet Content Providers (ICPs), and Internet Content Con-
sumers (users). ISPs derive revenues from providing Internet connectivity to both
ICPs and users, and are, therefore, concerned with the choices and costs of the
technologies used to implement this connectivity. They make the ultimate decision
to offer IPv6 connectivity to the other two stakeholders, hence, they play the most
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significant role in IPv6 adoption across the Internet. ICPs obtain the bulk of their
revenues from users that connect to them through ISPs. Hence, their focus is on
the quality of their connectivity to users and how it may affect their revenues, as
well as any cost they may incur to upgrade their existing infrastructure to support
a new connectivity option, e.g., IPv6. Finally, users purchase Internet connectivity
from ISPs, and use it primarily to connect to ICPs (and to a lesser extent to each
others). Hence, they are affected by the cost of Internet connectivity and by its
quality.
3.2.2 ISP’s connectivity options
ISPs are the providers of Internet connectivity, and therefore control technology
choices. Although IPv6 adoption is on the verge of happening, implicit to our mod-
eling effort lies the fact that IPv6 still faces competing solutions. Among those avail-
able technology choices ISPs may choose from to accommodate customer growth,
we consider three representatives.
The first choice an ISP can make is to simply continue using public IPv4 ad-
dresses. This has the advantage of full compatibility with the current Internet, but
given the growing scarcity of public IPv4 addresses is likely to quickly involve added
costs, e.g., to purchase public IPv4 addresses from an address market such as Hilco
Streambank IPv4 Address Marketplace.
The second option an ISP can rely on is to use private IPv4 addresses together
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with Carrier-Grade NATs (CGNs). Unlike public IPv4 addresses, private IPv4 ad-
dresses can be reused and so are not scarce. CGNs are required to allow connectivity
to the public Internet, but the technology behind CGNs is mature. Private IPv4
addresses also have the benefit of letting ISPs defer a potentially expensive upgrade
of their network to IPv6. The main disadvantage (to the ISP) is the cost of CGNs,
which grows as more users are assigned private IPv4 addresses.
IPv6 is the third option. IPv6 addresses are not scarce, but like private IPv4
addresses will require some form of “translation,” e.g., NAT64 [5] or DSLite [29], to
allow IPv6 users to communicate with the IPv4 Internet. IPv6↔IPv4 translation
is less mature than that for private IPv4 addresses, and may therefore be initially
more expensive. On the flip side, even if the exact time-frame remains unclear,
the need for translation, and therefore its cost, should disappear as the Internet
eventually migrates to IPv6.
3.2.3 Decision dependencies
As alluded to, although ISPs choose Internet technologies, their decisions, including
pricing, depend heavily on users and ICPs. For example, an ISP offering both IPv6
and (public) IPv4 connectivity might discount the IPv6 service, thereby attracting
users to that option and lowering the need for (expensive) public IPv4 addresses.
However, more IPv6 users also means higher translation costs, unless this entices
more ICPs to become IPv6 accessible thereby lessening the need for translation.
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This creates a complex web of dependencies, whose impact is amplified by the
distributed decision process that prevails in the Internet. As we shall see, this can
make devising sound (profit maximizing) strategies difficult if not impossible. We
show in the next sections that these dependencies indeed play a critical role in IPv6
adoption, and by breaking only one of the links in the web of dependencies, the
outcomes change drastically.
3.2.4 Scenarios
In many technology adoption instances presence of multiple entrants, and lack of
consensus on a single choice among stakeholders can prevent a full market pene-
tration by any of those choices. While competition of alternative solutions can be
helpful in keeping the evolution of a technology on the right track, consensus on one
choice makes a full market penetration faster and easier. In the case of IPv6, a full
market penetration is required, if the Internet is to avoid permanent traffic trans-
lation, therefore, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standardized IPv6 as
the replacement for IPv4. However, due to the hurdles in front of IPv6 adoption,
other alternative solutions have become popular among some ISPs.
As different ISPs manage separate Autonomous Systems (ASes), their decisions
are to some extent independent of each other. This heterogeneity among ISPs can
lead them to offer (at least temporarily) different connectivity solutions. Since ISPs
provide Internet connectivity, their heterogeneous decision making has a more sig-
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nificant impact on IPv6 adoption compared to other Internet stakeholders. There-
fore and in order to investigate this impact, we consider two major scenarios: (i) a
scenario in which ISPs disagree on immediately offering IPv6 connectivity to their
users; and (ii) a scenario in which all ISPs offer IPv6 along with other connectivity
options to their users. Next, we describe these two scenarios in more details.
Disagreement on offering IPv6
In this scenario, one ISP is always assumed to offer IPv6, as otherwise the outcome
is trivial, i.e., stagnation in IPv6 adoption, while the other ISP offers either public
or private IPv4 addresses.
Given that the main competition IPv6 faces is the incumbent IPv4 Internet, we
consider the case of two ISPs, one having embraced IPv6 as the technology of choice
for its new customers24, while the other has decided to defer any migration and to
simply acquire additional public IPv4 addresses to accommodate new customers.
The first ISP needs to deploy address translation devices to allow its new (IPv6)
customers to connect to the legacy IPv4 Internet. This cost grows with the number
of users that choose IPv6, and decreases as more ICPs become IPv6 accessible25.
Conversely, while the second ISP does not incur translation costs, it needs to pur-
chase public IPv4 addresses for its new customers. Those costs are expected to rise
24T-Mobile has recently started to only assign IPv6 addresses to its Android 4.4 users (see [77]).
25Translation costs are assumed proportional to the volume of traffic that needs to be translated,
i.e., higher capacity devices are needed.
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as public IPv4 addresses become scarcer.
Another variation of this scenario is when no ISP wants to incur the cost of
purchasing more public IPv4 addresses (or those addresses are unavailable for pur-
chase). ISPs that defer upgrading to IPv6 would then rely on private IPv4 addresses.
Offerings based on either IPv6 or private IPv4 addresses both require translation
(CGNs) to connect to the public IPv4 Internet. Translation costs for private IPv4
are likely to be lower than for IPv6, if only because of more mature technology
and/or greater operational familiarity and compatibility with the current Internet.
On the flip side, translation costs for private IPv4 keep increasing as more users
join, independent of how many ICPs become IPv6 accessible. We describe this
scenario in Appendix A.
Consensus on Offering IPv6
In this scenario, there exists a global consensus on offering IPv6 (along with other
service types), as a technology of choice to users, hence, all ISPs offer IPv6 and
another service, e.g., public IPv4.
On the technology choice front, this scenario is identical to the first one, namely,
both IPv6 and public IPv4 are available as connectivity options. The main difference
is that the two options are now systematically offered by all ISPs, and therefore
priced internally, as opposed to competitively, to maximize their own profit. The
price difference is a means of modeling, and can be interpreted as the cost of extra
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services that ISPs offer (for free) along with their IPv6 services, but charge users
for those same services in IPv4, e.g., static addresses (http://www.vo.lu) etc. This
scenario is equivalent to having a monopolistic ISP that sets the price of both
connectivity choices.
3.3 Models
Based on the scenarios of the last section, we developed models that capture the
interactions and decision dependencies of ISPs, ICPs and users. As alluded to in
section 3.2.3, the decisions of users depends on the decisions of ICPs and ISPs, and
vice versa. ISPs are the selectors of the technology and affect the interactions of
the other two stakeholders through their decisions. This framework is common to
other environments, e.g., gaming platforms, where the number of game developers
and the number of gamers are affected by the decisions of the console provider.
Analyzing these frameworks is typically through a two-sided market setting [69].
The ISP is the market maker through its offering of connectivity options, while
users and ICPs are the two sides of the market that derive value from each other
through the ISP.
We assume that at each step, new and existing users evaluate the Internet
connectivity choices available to them through their local ISP(s)26 and select the
26According to http://www.broadbandmap.gov/summarize/nationwide, over 99% of the
U.S. population can choose from two or more ISPs, while this figure is 90% in Europe (see
78
one yielding to the highest utility. One obvious shortcoming of this model is the lack
of inertia in decision making of users, i.e., every user decides at each time epoch,
therefore, in section 3.6 we investigate the robustness of our results in scenarios
where the users face some form of inertia, e.g., contractual agreements. We define
a user’s utility in Section 3.3.1, but it depends primarily on the cost and quality of
her Internet connectivity.
Users are assumed heterogeneous, but primarily in their sensitivity to connec-
tivity quality27. We further assume (see [27] for a related discussion) that address
translation devices, if used, are the main contributors to degradation in connectivity
quality/functionality.
Because ICPs are part of the current Internet, they already have a public IPv4
address, and their only decision is whether or not to become IPv6 accessible. They
incur a cost when doing so (upgrading their existing IPv4 infrastructure and/or
update of operational processes), but unlike users that can revert their decisions, an
ICP’s decision to become IPv6 accessible is irreversible (once incurring the upgrade
cost). Next, we present the utility functions of the Internet stakeholders.
http://goo.gl/MjTPJ6).
27Coarser grain heterogeneity is also possible, e.g., between, say, residential and enterprise users,
but adds significant complexity to the model. Similarly, heterogeneity in price sensitivity can also
be included, but with again a cost in terms of complexity.
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3.3.1 Users utility
Users derive a unit value from Internet connectivity, with price and quality affecting
their overall utility. An alternative model assumes heterogeneous values for different
connectivity options, however, since we use pricing as the control knob of the ISPs,
the former presentation is chosen (the outcomes are nevertheless similar). Recall
that quality is assumed to be primarily affected by (the presence of) translation
devices. A user’s utility is then captured through the following expression:
Uuser(σ) = 1− pR︸ ︷︷ ︸
VR
−σaRγR , (3.3.1)
whereR indexes connectivity options, pR is the price of typeR connectivity (ppub. IPv4 >
pIPv6 > ppriv. IPv4) (alternatively VR is the value of option R), aR ∈ [0, 1] quanti-
fies quality (translation) impairments for connectivity option R, if any (aR is 0 for
public IPv4 and positive for both private IPv4 and IPv6), γR is the fraction of the
Internet (ICPs) affected by those impairments, and σ denotes a user sensitivity to
quality impairments.
3.3.2 ICPs utility
ICPs derive revenues from users, and those revenues can be affected by connectivity
quality [73]. A major factor in an ICP’s decision to become IPv6 accessible28 is,
28As participation in events such “World IPv6 Launch Day” demonstrates, there are obviously
many other possible reasons for an ICP to become IPv6 accessible. However, even when those
other motivations prevail, the importance of preserving connectivity quality remains, e.g., through
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therefore, the impact this decision can have on the revenue it generates from IPv6
users, and how this compares to the cost of upgrading to IPv6 (or convincing its
hosting provider to upgrade). Revenue improvements depend on the number of
IPv6 users and how they are affected by the ICP’s adoption of IPv6. In particular,
and as shown in [62], IPv6 and IPv4 connectivity quality are now mostly on par, so
that the main benefit of native IPv6 access is to eliminate the need for translation.
The cost of upgrading to IPv6 is largely a function of the “size” of the ICP’s
infrastructure. For simplicity, this size is assumed proportional to the Internet
user-base (the traffic volume an ICP sees grows with the Internet). The net util-
ity in(de)crease an ICP derives from becoming IPv6 accessible can, therefore, be
captured as follows:
∆6(ICP) = βn6a6 − Sinfraθc6 (3.3.2)
where βn6 is the fraction of IPv6 users that an ICP can benefit from, a6 is the
per-user revenue gain from eliminating translation, and θc6 is the per-user upgrade
cost of the ICP’s infrastructure (of size Sinfra). β and θ capture heterogeneity in
revenue and cost, respectively, across ICPs.
the enforcement of some form of “white-listing.”
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3.3.3 ISP utility
An ISP’s utility (profit) depends on revenues derived from users29 and costs. Given
our aim of assessing the impact of offering different connectivity options, we focus
on their cost contributions and ignore other cost components. As costs differ across
connectivity options, we introduce the ISP’s utility function separately for each.
Public IPv4 only
An ISP that only offers public IPv4 connectivity has a utility function of the form:
Πpub. 4 = n4p4 − C(n4 − 1)2+ (3.3.3)
n4 is the number of users willing to pay p4 for public IPv4 connectivity, while C(n4−
1)2+ = C max(0, n4−1)2 is the acquisition cost of the (n4−1) additional public IPv4
addresses the ISP needs beyond the “unit” block it already owns (to accommodate
its existing users). The quadratic function used for address acquisition costs seeks to
capture the growth in the price of public IPv4 addresses due to increasing scarcity.
Section 3.6 changes this assumption, and investigates the impact of other functions
on the models outcome.
29We ignore revenues from ICPs, as they are mostly independent from an ISP’s connectivity
choices.
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IPv6 only (and IPv6↔IPv4 translation)
An ISP offering IPv6 connectivity has a utility of the form:
Π6 = n6p6 −D6n6γ6 , (3.3.4)
with n6 the number of users choosing IPv6 connectivity at a price of p6, and D6n6γ6
the translation cost for those users. This expression assumes each user generates
1 unit of traffic distributed uniformly across ICPs, so that if γ6 ICPs are not IPv6
accessible, n6γ6 units of traffic must be translated at a unit cost of D6.
Public IPv4 and IPv6
An ISP offering both public IPv4 and IPv6 has a utility that is simply the sum of
Eqs. (3.3.3) and (3.3.4) and is of the form:
Π46 = n4p4 − C(n4 − 1)2+ + n6p6 −D6n6γ6 . (3.3.5)
The next subsection explains the decision mechanism of the Internet stakehold-
ers, and the timing of those decisions.
3.3.4 Decision Mechanisms and Timing
In all scenarios, ISPs first announce a price for connectivity options, with users then
choosing one in a best response fashion, i.e., they select the option that maximizes
their utility. ICPs decide whether or not to become IPv6 accessible in the third
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and last stage of the game, again in a best response manner and based on the
number of users that have chosen IPv6. ISPs are assumed aware of the rationale
and economic incentives guiding users and ICPs decisions, e.g., based on surveys
of users and ICPs. Hence, they set prices that maximize their own profit, i.e., by
solving the above sequential decision process in reverse order. In the disagreement
scenario, where not all ISPs agree to offer IPv6 immediately, we assume the two
ISPs compete for the users by playing a best response game between themselves, and
their strategies are the prices of the services. In the consensus scenario, however,
the problem reduces to an internal optimization of a single ISP that offers both
services, namely, IPv4 and IPv6 connectivity.
An alternate game would have users and ICPs aware of each others decisions,
deciding simultaneously rather than sequentially. This assumes that users are able
to predict how ICPs will respond to their decisions and vice versa, and makes for
a more complex and possibly less realistic game (neither users nor ICPs may have
access to the necessary information). More importantly, the outcomes are similar to
those of the simpler sequential game. As a result, we focus on the latter. Another
alternative scenario is when the decision making process of ICPs is in a different
time scale compared to ISPs and users, i.e., ICPs re-evaluate their decisions less




This section considers scenario 3.2.4, which involves (two) ISPs competing for users
and offering different connectivity options. One ISP relies on IPv6, but the other
has deferred upgrading to IPv6. Instead, it chooses to either incur the (growing)
cost of acquiring public IPv4 addresses, or to assign private IPv4 address to new
users and rely on translation (CGNs) to connect them to the public Internet. Here
we present the solution to the former scenario (public IPv4 vs. IPv6), and relegate
the latter (private IPv4 vs. IPv6) to Appendix A.
Specifically, we assume rational and myopic ISPs that engage in a repeated
multi-stage game played each time the Internet user population increases by δ < 1
new users. Again, in this scenario, one ISP offers IPv6 and the other stays with
public IPv4 connectivity. Public IPv4 has an edge when it comes to connectivity
quality (a6 > 0), but that edge is present only for the fraction γ6 of ICPs that
require translation. Conversely, the disadvantage of public IPv4 is the likely cost of
acquiring additional public IPv4 addresses.
As per Eq. (3.3.1), users’ utility depends on price (pR), quality of connectivity
(aR), and the fraction γR of ICPs affected by quality impairment associated with
connectivity option R. γR is assumed known to users, and in the case of IPv6
depends on the outcome of the previous round of the game, i.e., how many ICPs
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have become natively accessible. For tractability purposes, we assume that σ, i.e.,
the sensitivity of users to quality impairments, is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Section 3.6 relaxes this assumption, and investigates the outcome with a more
general distribution.
Hence, in round i of the game and assuming IPv6 and public IPv4 ISPs an-
nounced prices of p6 and p4, users and ICPs decisions proceed as follows. Based on
Eq. (3.3.1), a user with quality sensitivity σ chooses IPv6 if, 1 − p6 − σa6γ(i−1)6 ≥
1 − p4, where γ(i−1)6 denotes the fraction of ICPs not yet IPv6 accessible after
round (i− 1) (this information is available after each round, with γ(0)6 = 0 for com-
pleteness). Hence, the fraction σ
(i)
6 of (new and existing











if 0 ≤ p4 − p6 ≤ a6γ(i−1)6
1 if p4 − p6 > a6γ(i−1)6
. (3.4.1)
The dependency on the price differential p4− p6 is intuitive. For example, when
IPv6 is priced higher than IPv4, IPv6 adoption is zero, while when the discount for
IPv6 is larger than the quality penalty perceived by the most quality sensitive user
(σ = 1), then all users select IPv6.
30In section 3.6 we show that our results remain qualitatively similar even if users have inertia
in decision making, e.g., contractual agreement, etc.
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An ICP reevaluates its IPv6 adoption decision once knowing the outcome of
users’ decisions. Again, for tractability purposes, ICPs are assumed to derive ho-
mogenous revenues from users (i.e., β = 1), but we relax this assumption in Section
3.6.
From Eq. (3.3.2), ICPs adopt IPv6 if the difference between the added revenue,
n6a6 (remember β = 1), this generates and the upgrade cost Sinfraθc6 is positive.
The latter depends on the current size of the ICP’s infrastructure, Sinfra, which is
proportional to the Internet user-base in round (i− 1), i.e., 1 + (i− 1)δ (where 1 is
the size of the existing Internet user population). Conversely, the revenue increase
created by becoming IPv6 accessible is proportional to the number of users choosing
IPv6 in round i, i.e., n
(i)
6 = (1 + iδ)σ
(i)
6 . Assuming θ is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1] (which we again relax in Section 3.6), ICPs for which becoming IPv6 accessible
yields a positive profit in round i are those with θ ≤ θ(i)6 (conversely, the fraction of
IPv6 accessible ICPs after round i is γ
(i)



















where for notation simplicity k = 1+iδ
1+(i−1)δ is the relative growth in user population
between rounds (i− 1) and i.




6 = 1, which yields the maximum possible adoption of IPv6 among ICPs. IPv6
adoption progressively decreases as fewer users select IPv6 (second expression),
down to no less than 1− γ(i−1)6 , which reflects the fact that ICPs that upgraded to
IPv6 in an earlier round do not revert their decisions.
Eqs. (3.4.1) and (3.4.2) are known to the two competing ISPs, which use them to
optimize their own utility functions, as expressed in Eqs. (3.3.3) and (3.3.4). This
yields the following expressions for optimal prices, where for simplicity we omit the
index i and use γ6 = 1− θ6.
p∗4 = argmax
p4
{(1 + iδ)(1− σ6)p4− (3.4.3)
C(((1 + iδ)(1− σ6))− 1)2+}
p∗6 = argmax
p6
{(1 + iδ)σ6p6 −D6σ6(1 + iδ)γ6} . (3.4.4)
The two equations are coupled through Eqs. (3.4.1) and (3.4.2).
Explicitly solving this joint optimization is difficult31. It can be formulated as the
solution of a best response game between the ISPs, each successively announcing
and reacting to the other’s price. In general, the game does not have a Nash
Equilibrium to which prices would converge. In particular and as illustrated in
section 3.5.1, instances of “cycles” in the ISPs’ search for optimal prices arise in
31Analytical solutions can be obtained, but are mostly negative results, e.g., the absence of a
Nash Equilibrium, which do not shed insight into the problem. Hence, we resort to numerical
investigations to explore the solution space.
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many cases. In other words, competition (or disagreement) between ISPs on the
basis of connectivity makes identifying rational operating (pricing) points difficult.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, dependencies between Internet stakeholders’
decisions are largely responsible for this. In particular, if ICPs’ decisions were
independent of those of users (or proceeded at a much slower pace), the game
would typically admit a unique Nash Equilibrium (see Appendix C).
3.4.2 Consensus Scenario
A scenario where all ISPs offer IPv6 and another alternative, e.g., public IPv4, is
equivalent to a monopolistic ISP that serves all of the users. Choices need to be
preserved, as users (and ICPs) are likely to remain heterogeneous in their willingness
to accept a migration to IPv6. However, connectivity options should not be the basis
on which ISPs compete. In other words, this scenario is equivalent to a pricing
problem including a single provider with two types of products.
Consider an ISP offering its users (new and existing) the choice between tradi-
tional public IPv4 connectivity and IPv6 connectivity at prices of p4 and p6, respec-
tively. As in the previous section, users that opt for IPv6 must undergo translation
when connecting to the γ6 fraction of ICPs that are not yet IPv6 accessible. As
before, translation introduces impairments of relative magnitude a6. Similarly, the
ISP incurs a cost of D6 per unit of traffic that needs translation. The ISP has an
existing user-base of unit size, and therefore owns a unit-size block of public IPv4
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addresses. If it needs additional public IPv4 addresses, it acquires them at a cost
that, again as before, grows quadratically, i.e., based on Eq. (3.3.3). ICPs decide
to become IPv6 accessible following the same process as that of last section. We
describe next how the ISP selects the prices p4 and p6 that maximize its profit.
Growth in the Internet user population again proceeds in steps of size δ that
coincide with epochs where the ISP adjusts its prices p4 and p6. Choosing optimal
prices involves solving the following optimization problem











































6 = 1− θ(i−1)6 is known, while θ(i)6 needs to be replaced by its expression
from Eq. (3.4.2). Note that different expressions must be used for θ
(i)
6 depending
on the value of p4 − p6. It is the need to consider those different cases that makes
solving Eq. (3.4.5) cumbersome though not impossible.
Except for the fact that the optimal price for public IPv4 always satisfies p4 = 1
(actually just below 1 to ensure positive utility), the expression for an explicit solu-
tion for Eq. (3.4.5) sheds little light on the role of different parameters, the reader
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is referred to [60] for more details. for details, and we instead rely on numerical
examples to explore the range of outcomes. The next section discusses the results
of numerical analyses of the models.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 The Impact of Disagreement
ISPs’ inability to converge to jointly optimal prices is primarily because the coupling
between users and ICPs’ decisions introduces two distinct strategies for the IPv6
ISP, and correspondingly a discontinuity in its utility function. When the price
of public IPv4 connectivity is high enough, it is best for the IPv6 ISP to heavily
discount its connectivity to attract many users and in turn convince many ICPs to
become IPv6 accessible, which lowers translation costs. This, however, triggers a
price decrease from the public IPv4 ISP to recoup part of its lost user-base, and
then forces the IPv6 ISP to itself lower its price to maintain a sufficiently attractive
discount. This eventually results in a public IPv4 price that is too low to allow the
IPv6 ISP to give a large enough discount. The better strategy for the IPv6 ISP is
then to reduce its discount and attract fewer users. Each user generates a higher
revenue, and because there are few of them, translation costs are low. This pattern
is shown in Fig. 3.1 that plots each ISPs’ best-responses as a function of the other’s
price, and includes an instance of a pricing cycle.
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IP v4 ISP Best Response
IP v6 ISP Best Response
Figure 3.1: Cycle in ISPs best response game
Cycles occur when the utility gap between the two strategies of the IPv6 ISP
is large enough to ensure that its best-response function and that of the IPv4 ISP
do not intersect. Fig. 3.2 explores how often this arises across a reasonable range
of configurations. The price of IPv4 addresses is chosen to have a normalization
constant C = 1, so that the quadratic cost function for IPv4 addresses yields a
value of 1 when the number of IPv4 Internet users reaches n4 = 2, i.e., doubles.
In other words, doubling the size of the current IPv4 Internet yields a public IPv4
address price equal to the value of Internet connectivity itself. This choice reflects
the fact that according to current statistics there were about 2 billion Internet users
by the end of 2012, and given the ≈ 50 − 75% utilization of the address space, a
doubling of IPv4 users is then still possible. The per-user IPv6 conversion cost, c6,
is assumed to be ten percent of the base value of Internet connectivity.
Fig. 3.2 shows the outcome of the game played by the two ISPs as a function
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Figure 3.2: IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition
of unit translation costs, D6, and the non-native connectivity quality impairment a
user incurs, a. D6 is varied from zero to ten percent of the per user IPv4 address
acquisition cost, while a is varied from zero to the per user IPv6 conversion cost
an ICP incurs. The figure illustrates the presence of cycles in a wide range of
configurations, and in particular as soon as both a and D6 slightly grow from
zero. Similar results emerge from a scenario with an IPv6 ISP and a private IPv4
ISP, but we relegate them to Appendix A. These results show that disagreement
between ISPs on offering IPv6 as a connectivity option can potentially derail the
current progress of IPv6 adoption, by making it hard for the Internet stakeholders
to identify winning strategies.
93
3.5.2 The Benefit of Consensus
The previous section illustrated the difficulty of devising effective strategies, when
ISPs tackle public IPv4 address shortage with competing connectivity options. The
intent of this section is not to argue that to migrate to an IPv6 Internet, we need
to forfeit competition among ISPs. This would be neither realistic nor meaningful.
Instead, we want to argue for shifting competition away from connectivity choices,
i.e., have a consistent offering of connectivity choices among ISPs.
Unsurprisingly, IPv6 adoption and the ISP’s pricing strategy are directly af-
fected by C, the normalization constant for the cost of acquiring additional public
IPv4 addresses, and D6, the translation cost of one unit of traffic. In addition, two
other parameters indirectly affect the ISP’s strategy because of how they influence
users and ICPs decisions, namely, c6, the per-user cost of upgrading an ICP’s infras-
tructure to IPv6, and a, the relative magnitude of the impairment that translation
causes, and consequently the loss in quality-of-experience for users and the related
revenue loss for the ICPs.
It is possible to scope the ranges some of those parameters can span, e.g., C ≤ 1,
but a complete sampling of this four-dimensional space is impractical. We rely
instead on several figures to report how the outcome changes as some parameters
vary, while others remain fixed. The figures help identify parameters that have
a significant effect on IPv6 adoption by both users and ICPs; hence suggesting
possible strategies.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates an intuitive outcome, and in the process offers some level
of “sanity checking” of the model. In particular, it confirms the expected negative
impact on ICPs’ adoption of decreasing their adoption costs, c6, while a remains
constant. However, this figure alone ignores the effect of a, which as we discuss
next, can have an ambivalent effect. a is the only factor that couples ISPs, ICPs
and users, hence, it is important to investigate its impact on the future of IPv6
adoption.
Figs. 3.4 and 3.5 plot four quantities as a function of a, while c6 is assumed
to stay put32. The left hand-sides of the figures give the cumulative per-user dis-
count the ISP offers to its users, and the ISP’s total profit when the size of the
Internet user population grows by 100%. The right hand-sides of the figures give,
after doubling the size of the Internet user population (i.e., growth by 100%), the
(final) fractions of users that have opted for IPv6, and ICPs that have become IPv6
accessible. The figures report the results for two different configurations, namely,
small and large values of C, and for each configuration consider different ratios be-
tween translation costs and IPv4 address acquisition costs, i.e., D6/C takes values
0.1, 1 and 10. These figures identify two parameters that have an impact on IPv6
adoption, namely, a and D6.
Consider first the effect of a decrease in the level of impairment, a, that trans-
lation imposes. Such a decrease can (initially) make IPv6 more attractive to users
32Although c6 remains constant throughout the analysis, in the above ratio it serves as a nor-
malization factor.
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Figure 3.3: ICPs adoption levels for small C
by lowering the penalty they incur when accessing ICPs that are not yet IPv6 ac-
cessible. This can increase the number of users that choose IPv6, which can in turn
entice more ICPs to become IPv6 accessible; possibly starting a positive feedback
loop in IPv6 adoption. On the flip side, a lower a value also decreases the potential
per-user revenue gain ICPs derive from becoming IPv6 accessible. This makes it
more likely that revenue increases won’t offset adoption costs; hence reducing ICPs’
adoption of IPv6. This would in turn make IPv6 less attractive to users, and having
fewer users opting for IPv6 would further reduce its attractiveness to ICPs. As we
can see, the role of changes in a on IPv6 adoption is unclear, and the figures help
elucidate under which conditions changes in a improve IPv6 adoption.
First, the figures illustrate that an increase in a (equivalently, in the ratio a/c6)
systematically results in higher IPv6 adoption by ICPs and to a lesser extent users.
In the case of ICPs, a/c6 represents the ICP’s return on IPv6 adoption from a single
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Figure 3.4: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for small C
















































































Figure 3.5: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for large C
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user. An increase in this return motivates more ICPs to make such an adoption
choice. When this increase is through an increase in a (rather than a decrease in
c6 that is trivially beneficial to both ICPs and users), the greater number of ICPs
that opt to become IPv6 accessible offsets the larger penalty that users suffer when
accessing ICPs that are not IPv6 accessible. In other words, users experience greater
impairments when accessing ICPs that still require translation, but because there
are fewer such ICPs, the impact is mitigated. Consequently, the number of users
that choose IPv6 is not overly affected even if differences exist. In general, while
both Figs. 3.4 and 3.5 establish that a larger ratio a/c6 benefits IPv6 adoption by
both ICPs and users, ensuring a complete migration to an IPv6 Internet requires a
large enough value. How large this value needs to be depends on a number of factors,
and in particular C and D6, which as we discuss next introduce some interesting
behaviors in their own right.
Specifically, consider scenarios in Figs. 3.4 and 3.5, for which the ICPs’ return
on IPv6 adoption, a/c6, is low (less than one), i.e., the ICPs have limited incentives
for becoming IPv6 accessible. In such a regime, low translations costs33, D6, afford
the ISP enough leeway to price IPv6 competitively and convince some users, and
consequently ICPs, to adopt IPv6. This is reflected in the higher adoption levels of
both users and ICPs as D6 decreases. Interestingly, increasing the ICPs’ return on
IPv6 adoption a/c6 has little effect on the number of users that adopt IPv6, though
33Note that changes in translation costs are chosen proportional to C, which explains in part
the similarity of Figs. 3.4 and 3.5.
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it affects (increases) the number of ICPs that elect to become IPv6 accessible. As
alluded to earlier, this is because while there may be more ICPs that can be accessed
natively over IPv6, this benefit is offset by the greater impairments users experience
when accessing the remaining ICPs.
Further increases in the ICPs’ return on IPv6 adoption (a/c6) eventually trigger
a shift in adoption, with all users and ICPs adopting IPv6. When and how this shift
happens is, however, affected by the relative magnitude of IPv4 address acquisition
costs, C, and IPv6 address translation costs, D6.
When IPv4 address acquisition costs are high, and a/c6 > 1 (Fig. 3.5), the
shift is abrupt. This is because the high cost of IPv4 addresses entices the ISP
to aggressively discount IPv6 early on to quickly convince ICPs and users alike to
adopt IPv6. This can be seen by comparing the left hand-side plots of Figs. 3.4
and 3.5 that report the total discount the ISP offers to entice users to adopt IPv6,
and the ISP’s total profit, which shows this abrupt transition is beneficial to the
ISP by saving large discounts given to users. In contrast, when IPv4 addresses
costs are relatively low and a/c6 > 1 (Fig. 3.4), the slow decrease in total discount
(increase in total profit) can be seen to be dependent on the relative magnitude of
translation costs.
In particular, with low translation costs (D6), an ISP may initially offer only
a limited discount for IPv6, which can prevent full IPv6 adoption and prolong
the coexistence of IPv4-only and IPv6-only Internets (as the Internet user-base
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grows, so do the benefits for ICPs of becoming IPv6 accessible, but also do their
upgrade costs). In other words, if IPv4 addresses remain cheap for an extended
period of time, it not only prolongs the transition to an IPv6 Internet, it may also
make it significantly more expensive by deterring many ICPs from migrating early;
hence, incurring higher conversion costs later on (they will need to convert a bigger
infrastructure).
The next section summarizes our findings, while suggesting guidelines to avoid
strategies that can derail IPv6 adoption in the future.
3.5.3 Findings
This section summarizes five of the major findings models of the previous section
posit:
(i) Disagreement between ISPs on what connectivity options they offer to their
users has a deteriorating effect on IPv6 adoption. As a result, ISPs should avoid
only offering alternatives to IPv6, since it can derail the progress of IPv6 adoption.
(ii) Consensus among ISPs on offering IPv6 adoption along with other con-
nectivity options, helps identify strategies that lead to a smooth IPv6 adoption
progress. In other words, when ISPs all offer IPv6 as one of their connectivity
options, devising successful migration strategies becomes easier for other major
Internet stakeholders.
(iii) Decreasing the migration costs for ICPs c6 accelerates IPv6 adoption. Tech-
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nology developers should facilitate migration to IPv6 by developing more affordable
IPv6 technologies.
(iv) Although the existence of translation devices (IPv4↔IPv6) is necessary
for an uninterrupted migration to an IPv6 Internet, the presence of high quality
translation devices (i.e., small a) has a negative impact on IPv6 adoption by ICPs,
since these devices facilitate a loss-less access to IPv4-only content for IPv6-only
users, hence, eliminating incentives for IPv6 adoption by ICPs.
(v) Translation costs incurred by ISPs D6 can have an ambivalent effect on IPv6
adoption: when translation impairment level (a) is small, smaller translation costs
(D6) accelerates IPv6 adoption by ICPs and users, and also contributes to higher
profits for ISPs; however, when a is large, the impact of D6 depends on the cost of
IPv4 address acquisition C, when C is small, larger D6 values are beneficial, but
when C is large, D6 has a neutral impact on IPv6 adoption.
These findings are the outcome of models from previous sections, which, for
tractability and clarification, were solved with some simplifying assumptions, e.g.,
homogenous revenue for ICPs, uniform distribution of users’ sensitivity to qual-
ity, etc. In order to investigate the potential impact of these assumptions on our




In order to capture the real world phenomena in a tractable way, every model makes
some simplifying assumptions. Our modeling effort is not an exception, however,
to ensure our findings are not artifacts of those assumptions, we perform a series
of robustness analyses. The goal of this section is to show, through variations of
the models presented in Section 3.3, that our results remain qualitatively similar
to those of Section 4.5, and the findings of Section 3.5.3 hold. Next, we present a
summary of these variations.
(i) Heterogeneity in revenue and cost of ICPs: In the current solution, we
assume that ICPs derive revenue from users homogeneously. In reality, however,
the revenues are heterogeneous, and mostly depend on the volume of an ICP’s
traffic, i.e., popularity. Furthermore, we assume the adoption costs are uniformly
distributed across ICPs, while in the real world, larger ICPs possibly benefit from
economies of scale. Hence, in this variation of the model, we assume the revenue
and cost of an ICP depends on its popularity.
(ii) Users’ sensitivity to quality impairments (σ): In our current model, this
parameter is assumed to be uniformly distributed, while in reality, the distribution
is most probably not uniform. It is hard, if not impossible, to determine the exact
distribution in these scenarios, however, if similar (qualitative) outcomes emerge
with different distributions, the findings are on a more solid footing. Therefore, in
this variation we assume users’ sensitivity to quality impairments follows a different
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distribution.
(iii) Users’ decision making inertia: Currently, our model assumes that all
users make decisions after each announcement of prices by ISPs. That might not
be practical in all scenarios, i.e., many ISPs impose contractual agreements on their
users. Thus, in this variation of the model, we incorporate inertia in users’ decisions
through contractual agreements.
(iv) IPv4 address acquisition cost: In our current model, this cost is captured
via a quadratic function, which reflects a scenario with growing scarcity of IPv4
addresses. However, another scenario involves ISPs with extra IPv4 addresses pro-
viding the market with enough resources to keep the cost constant. Therefore, in
this variation of the model we assume the cost of IPv4 address acquisition grows
linearly.
(v) The per-user cost of IPv6 adoption by ICPs (c6): In our current model,
this cost is assumed to stay put over time. However, it is more likely that it
decreases as the technology matures. Hence, this variation of the model incorporates
a decreasing per-user cost of IPv6 adoption.
3.6.1 Heterogeneity of ICPs
ICPs are heterogeneous in many aspects. However, it is not practical, from a model-
ing standpoint, to capture all of those dimensions. Moreover, from the perspective of
our model, it is only the net effect of those heterogeneities that matters. Therefore,
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here we only focus on one aspect of heterogeneity among ICPs, namely, popularity.
We present next the changes required in the utility function of ICPs to incorporate
this aspect.
The popularity is captured in Eq. (3.3.2) through parameter β, which, in previ-
ous sections, was assumed to be equal to 1 (i.e., β = 1) yielding to a homogenous
revenue across all ICPs. Here, we assume β is distributed in [0, 2] with a certain
probability distribution34. We assume that most ICPs are of similar popularity, but
some are either highly popular or unpopular. This leads to the choice of a uni-
modal bell-shaped distribution function, which is adequate to show how differences
in popularity of ICPs can potentially change our findings35. Without loss of gener-
ality, and to extend the tractability of our model, we use a unimodal Kumaraswamy
distribution function for β.
Moreover, in order to incorporate the economy of scale in IPv6 adoption deci-
sions of ICPs, we choose θ, the parameter that captures adoption cost heterogeneity
across ICPs (in Eq. (3.3.2)), to be a function of their popularity. In other words,
we choose θ to be a decreasing function of β, to reflect the economy of scale, i.e., a
more popular ICP with a larger user-base incurs (on average) lower per-user IPv6
adoption costs. Although changes in β and θ only affect the decision making process
of ICPs, their incorporation in the model help capture a more general, and perhaps
34Choosing [0, 2] instead of [0, 1] only makes it easier to compare the outcome with the current
outcomes, without loss of generality.
35Similar results emerge when we use a bimodal distribution function.
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more realistic, picture of the IPv6 adoption problem. Next we show the impact of
these changes on our earlier model formulation.
Formulation
Without loss of generality, we choose θ = 2−β
2+β
, which bounds θ in [0, 1], and is a
decreasing function of β. It can be easily shown, through numerical analysis, that
this choice is as good as any other decreasing function.
While the expressions for users and ISPs remain the same as Eqs. (3.4.1), (A.0.5)
and (A.0.6), γ
(i)
6 , the fraction of ICPs that do not choose IPv6 at the end of round










































where KA,B(.) denotes the Kumaraswamy function with parameters A and B
(the rest of the parameters are introduced in Eq. (3.4.2)). With the proper values
for A and B, one can achieve a uni-modal distribution function in [0, 1]. Next, we
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compare the findings from this variation of the model with our original findings.
Results
Comparing Fig. 3.6 with Fig. 3.2, one can see that this scenario yields to similar
outcomes as the original scenario, i.e., in the majority of the cases the disagreement
between ISPs ends in a cyclical behavior. Therefore, the first finding of Section 3.5.3,
i.e., detrimental effect of disagreement between ISPs on technology options, holds
even in the presence of heterogeneity in revenue and cost of ICPs.
The results of the consensus scenario with popularity incorporated in ICP’s
decisions, are labeled “Uni-modal β” in Figs. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10. In this scenario
we assume a small C value, and D6 = 0.1C, hence, we can compare them with the
corresponding curve in Fig. 3.4, which is also plotted (for more convenience ) in
the above figures under the label “Original Scenario”. A similar figure to Fig. 3.4
is relegated to Appendix B.
Comparing “Uni-modal β” curves with the “Original Scenario” (in the above
figures), one can see quantitative differences, i.e., the Uni-modal β scenario yields
to slightly lower discounts given by ISPs, higher total profits for ISPs, and different
adoption rates for users and ICPs. The main reason behind these differences is
that in this scenario compared to the original scenario, more popular ICPs derive
higher benefits from IPv6 adoption, therefore, their adoption rate is higher. Higher
adoption rate by popular ICPs causes lower translation costs by ISPs, and therefore
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lower discounts and higher profits. Users also have greater incentives to adopt IPv6
in the presence of higher adoption rate by ICPs. This is only true for small values
of translation impairments (a), and for larger values of this variable most of the
incentives fade away, and cause lower overall adoption rates by users and ICPs.
These quantitative differences nonetheless, the outcomes are qualitatively similar,
i.e., the patterns are almost similar across all metrics, namely, discounts by ISPs,
ISPs’ profit, and adoption rates by users and ICPs. In other words, findings (ii)
to (v) of Section 3.5.3 hold in the presence of heterogeneity in revenue and cost of
ICPs.












Figure 3.6: IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition — single-modal β
3.6.2 Users Sensitivity
In the original scenario, we assumed that sensitivity to quality impairments is dis-
tributed uniformly across users. To investigate the dependency of our findings to
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Linear IPv4 Acquisition Cost
Decreasing c6
Original Scenario
Figure 3.7: ISP’s total per-user discount offered to users






















Linear IPv4 Acquisition Cost
Decreasing c6
Original Scenario
Figure 3.8: ISP’s total profit
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Figure 3.9: Final IPv6 adoption by users






















Linear IPv4 Acquisition Cost
Decreasing c6
Original Scenario
Figure 3.10: Final IPv6 adoption by ICPs
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this assumption, it is best to substitute the distribution with a general distribution
function. However, this seems impractical given that we rely on numerical analysis.
Therefore, we only focus on a uni-modal bell-shaped distribution function, which is
commonly seen in real world phenomena.
Formulation
In our model, sensitivity to quality impairments is specific to users, hence, the
model formulation remains the same for ICPs and ISPs. The changes to users is









which is similar to Eq. (3.4.1) except forKA,B(.) that as alluded to earlier denotes
the Kumaraswamy distribution function with parameters A and B.
Results
Similar to the previous section, comparing Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.2, one can see
that the choice of distribution function for users’ sensitivity to quality impairments
(σ), does not change the outcomes qualitatively. Therefore, the first finding of
Section 3.5.3 holds in the presence of a different distribution for σ.
We plot the outcomes of the consensus scenario in Figs. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10
under the label “Uni-modal σ”. Again, in this scenario the value of C is small and
D6 = 0.1C (a similar figure to Fig. 3.4 is relegated to Appendix B). Comparing
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these curves with the corresponding “Original Scenario” curves, one can see slight
quantitative differences, which are mainly an artifact of a different distribution
for σ. However, the patterns are qualitatively similar to the original scenario. In
other words, findings (ii) to (v) of Section 3.5.3 hold in the presence of a different
distribution for σ.












Figure 3.11: IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition — single-modal σ
3.6.3 Users Inertia
In our initial solution we assumed all users re-evaluate their decisions after each
price announcement by ISPs. In reality, this might be violated due to the inertia in
decision making process of users; the most common source of this inertia is involve-
ment in a contractual agreement, which bars users from changing their services at
any time. Hence, we need to examine the validity of our findings in the presence
of such inertia. In the consensus scenario, this assumption does not play a signifi-
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cant role, because the monopolistic ISP can assign services to its users at any given
time, in order to maximize its profit (i.e., contractual agreements are internal to
the ISP). However, in the scenario with disagreement among ISPs on offering IPv6,
we need to analyze the model with the assumption that not all users can change
their services after each announcement.
Formulation
The original formulation of the problem does not change, except that in Eqs. A.0.5,
A.0.6 and 3.4.5, we substitute (1 + iδ), with a fraction of users that can make
decisions at epoch i. In other words, instead of the total user population, here only
a fraction of them make a decision.
Results
Fig. 3.12 demonstrates the outcome of the analysis for the above variation of the
model. Comparing it with the results of our original scenario plotted in Fig. 3.2, one
can see the similarity of results. In other words, this result confirms that inertia in
decision making of users does not change our first finding of Section 3.5.3 regarding
the disagreement scenario. The rest of the findings also remain intact, since the
contractual agreements do not affect them.
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Figure 3.12: IPv6 & public IPv4 consensus — contractual agreement
3.6.4 IPv4 Address Acquisition Cost
In the original scenario, we assumed that the cost of IPv4 address acquisition grows
quadratically with the number of addresses (the per address cost grows linearly).
We made this assumption to capture the increasing cost of IPv4 addresses as they
become scarcer. However, an alternative scenario is when ISPs with extra IPv4 ad-
dresses sell their addresses in the corresponding markets, and therefore, the supply
of addresses meets the demand. In this situation, the cost of IPv4 addresses grows
linearly with the number of addresses (per address cost remains constant). Here,
we examine the extensibility of our findings to such scenario.
Formulation
We only need to substitute the quadratic function in the ISP’s utility with a linear
function. In other words, in Eqs. A.0.5 and 3.4.5, we replace C((1+iδ)(1−σ6)−1)2+
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with C((1 + iδ)(1− σ6)− 1)+.
Results
We plot the outcome of the disagreement scenario in Fig. 3.13, which is quite
similar to the outcome of the original scenario in Fig. 3.2, i.e., the cycles are present
predominantly. Therefore, the first finding of Section 3.5.3 holds for this variation
of the model.
We also plot the results of the consensus scenario in Figs. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and
3.10 under “Linear IPv4 Acquisition Cost”. Once again, this scenario is for a small
value of C and D6 = 0.1C (with a similar figure to Fig. 3.4 relegated to Appendix
B). Comparing these curves with the corresponding “Original Scenario” curves, one
can observe quantitative differences. However, these differences do not affect the
overall patterns of adoption, i.e., the patterns are qualitatively similar. Therefore,
findings (ii) to (v) of Section 3.5.3 extend to this variation of the model.
3.6.5 Per-User Cost of IPv6 Adoption by ICPs
In the original scenario, we assumed that the per-user cost of IPv6 adoption for
ICPs remains constant over time. However, in reality, as technology matures the
cost of adoption also decreases. Here, we investigate the validity of our results in
such scenario.
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Figure 3.13: IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition — linear IPv4 address acquisition
cost
Formulation
The formulation remains the same for almost all equations, and the only difference
is that we replace c6 in Eq. (3.4.2) with c6(i), a decreasing function of i.
Results
Comparing Figs. 3.14 and Fig. 3.2 shows that temporal decrease of c6 does not
change the overall pattern of our results, i.e., the first finding of Section 3.5.3.
Comparing the curves labeled “Decreasing c6” and “Original Scenario” in Figs.
3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, it can be easily seen that there are significant quantitative
differences (a similar figure to Fig. 3.4 is relegated to Appendix B). However, this is
not surprising, as decreasing the cost of IPv6 should speed up the adoption process
by ICPs, which consequently causes higher profit for ISPs and higher adoption rates
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for users. This exactly re-enforces what the third finding of Section 3.5.3 states.
Also, the qualitative similarities between the outcomes of this scenario and the
original scenario validates findings (iv) and (v) of Section 3.5.3.












Figure 3.14: IPv6 vs. public IPv4 competition — decreasing c6
3.7 Related Works
Explaining the slow progress of IPv6 adoption has been the focus of much prior
work (see [20, 21] for a recent overview). Earlier works focused on identifying
technical issues that created initial adoption hurdles [15, 57, 87, 94], but as those
were eventually addressed, the attention shifted towards measuring IPv6 adoption
progress [6, 8, 17, 19, 25, 40, 48, 63, 72], as well as exploring the role that economic
forces may be playing [?, 28, 30,34,39,64,78].
Those latter works bear the most direct relevance to the investigation presented
116
in this chapter, with [28] echoing many of the same themes we identify, including
the importance of coordination, albeit without analytical support. Casting IPv6
adoption as a game was proposed in [78], but one with Autonomous Systems as the
sole players, i.e., it did not account for either users or ICPs. The use of two-sided
markets to capture dependencies between the decisions of Internet stake-holders
was suggested in [34], but used simply to assess the impact of changing certain
parameters, i.e., it did not explore the possibility or competition between ISPs nor
how the presence of coordinated revenue maximization by ISPs would influence the
outcome.
There is also a vast literature on two-sided markets, and the reader is referred
to [70, 71] for recent surveys. The most relevant works deal with competing plat-
forms [4, 69], e.g., IPv4 and IPv6, but the absence of pricing for one side of the
market (the ICPs) in our context makes for a very different (and simpler) focus.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter’s work motivation is to shed light on what can potentially affect, pos-
itively or negatively, the current accelerated progress of IPv6 adoption. It proposes
a number of models that capture the dependencies between different Internet stake-
holders and consider various connectivity options. We therefore, explore how these
dependencies and connectivity options affect the decisions of Internet stakeholders
in migrating to IPv6. A first set of scenarios consider ISPs that respond to IPv4
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address scarcity differently, namely, by using different connectivity options. The
ISPs compete to attract users on the basis of connectivity options, and the models
demonstrate how in these scenarios devising an effective IPv6 adoption strategy
may be difficult, and that stakeholders can potentially derail the current progress
of IPv6 adoption.
We then explore an alternative scenario in which ISPs still preserve the ability
to offer multiple connectivity options, but all of them have a consensus on offering
IPv6 as one of those options. While this is not by itself sufficient to maintain the
current acceleration in IPv6 adoption, it affords a more predictable look at how
different factors can affect the progress. In particular, it helped identify translation
impairments a as an important factor that can negatively or positively affect the
adoption of IPv6 in the future, i.e., larger values can motivate ICPs to adopt IPv6 to
avoid loss of revenue and at the same time deter users from adopting the technology,
while smaller values reduces incentives for ICPs and motivates users. The model
also helped identify the role IPv4 address acquisition cost C and translation cost D6
play. In particular, it showed that low IPv4 address acquisition costs can derail the
progress of IPv6 adoption at least temporarily. Even if the latter is to some extent
due to the myopic decision making process of ISPs in the models, the presence of a
more strategic decision does not change the outcomes significantly.
The models on which this chapter’s investigation is based have numerous obvi-
ous limitations, and fail to capture the impact of many other factors. However, they
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capture the interdependencies between different Internet stakeholders and their de-
cisions. As such the results offer some insight into the potential factors that can
derail or accelerate the progress of IPv6 adoption in the future.
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Chapter 4
Key Factors in Protocol Adoption
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4.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the networking community has learned much about protocol
design, be it in terms of performance, scalability, security, etc., or even in some cases
guaranteeing the correctness of a protocol. However, we know much less about what
controls a protocol’s success in the “real world”. IPv6 is a well-known instance,
which more than two decades after its introduction still struggles to achieve wide
adoption. And there are many other examples. Since 1969 the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) has produced over 3100 standards track Request for Comments
(RFCs). However, in spite of a rigorous vetting process, the odds are little better
than even36 for those protocols to succeed, i.e., be widely adopted by their target
audience.
This raises a number of important questions that, except for RFC 5218 [76],
surprisingly, have not been really addressed by previous research37. In particular,
are specific features or properties more important than others when it comes to
influencing a protocol’s success? Clearly, technical correctness is important, but
we have arguably made much progress in weeding out flawed protocols. External
factors such as luck or commercial interests will always be present, but are unlikely
to translate into systematic biases. The question is whether it is possible to carry
out a quantitative and statistically rigorous investigation of protocols and protocol
36A random sample of close to 200 standard tracks RFCs yields a success rate of about 60%.
37Related works are primarily in the realm of “network economics” and therefore with a different
focus than this study.
121
extensions38 to identify factors with a significant influence on their success (or fail-
ure). Additionally, do these factors vary as a function of a protocol’s type, i.e., the
functionality and environment it targets?
In this study, we apply statistical tools to mine a rich and diverse repository
of protocols, namely standards track RFCs. Standards track RFCs correspond to
protocols that have progressed through rounds of discussions in an IETF Working
Group (WG), and been deemed stable and significant enough to warrant formal
publication. This should, therefore, eliminate technically flawed protocols, as well as
those with little community support. Our goal is to identify statistically significant
features that play an important role in a protocol’s success, with success defined
as “broad-based” adoption among intended users. Note that in identifying such
features, we do not seek to build a prediction tool. Instead, we aim to offer guidance
to protocol designers by highlighting features that may be of particular significance
for different types of protocols.
Our approach is three-prong. We first identify features, which reflect protocol
characteristics that may play a role in their success. Crafting such a list is a some-
what subjective process that borrows on our experience with protocols and protocol
design. We discuss our approach and its outcome in Section 4.2. Next, we construct
a data set that we analyze statistically. This data set is built from a random sam-
ple of standards track RFCs (Section 4.3 discusses the selection process), which
38For conciseness and unless otherwise warranted, we use the term protocol to refer to both new
protocols and extensions or new versions of existing protocols.
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are then characterized in terms of their features as well as labeled as successful or
not. Finally, as described in Section 4.4, we apply a well-established classification
framework to extract protocol features that show statistically significant correlation
with the success or failure of protocols. The results are then analyzed in Section 4.5
to explore their implications, and Section 4.6 performs a limited validation.The
outcomes of the analysis are both intuitive and surprising. As expected, prediction
accuracy remains in the 70− 80% ranges, as our focus on design features does not
account for the likelihood that other non-technical factors play a role in a proto-
col’s success. The results also confirm that markedly different features affect the
success of protocols of different types. For example, while backward compatibility
plays a critical role in the success of protocol extensions or new versions of existing
protocols, it is of little relevance when it comes to new protocols. Other findings
are, however, less immediately obvious. For example, the most significant factor
contributing to the success of new application and transport layer protocols was the
extent to which they were of benefit to other existing protocols. Similarly, the suc-
cess of network control protocols depended heavily on their ability to realize their
full value once deployed within a domain (as opposed to Internet-wide deployment).
We expand on these aspects in Section 4.5.
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4.2 Protocol Adoption Features
Network protocols span many functionalities, designs, and implementations. How
do we capture features that set them apart, possibly influencing adoption outcomes?
In this section, we put forward a nomenclature that incorporates both traditional
differentiators used when describing protocols, e.g., the layer they target, and as-
pects of value and dependencies on other protocols.
4.2.1 Characterizing Protocols
We characterize features that may play a role in a protocol’s adoption along three
major axes: (i) functionality and role; (ii) impact and/or dependency on other
protocols; and (iii) primary value and how it is realized. A protocol’s functionality
and role affect when and where it is needed, and therefore its adoption. Similarly,
how and how much a protocol interfaces to other protocols or requires them to
change can make adoption harder or easier. Finally, the benefits that a protocol
affords its users and when it allows them to accrue those benefits likely also plays
a major role in its adoption.
In classifying protocols along those three axes, the first broadly partitions pro-
tocols according to the position (layer) they occupy in the protocol ecosystem. The
second characterizes a protocol based on features that describe its interactions with
other protocols, including earlier versions of itself, when applicable. Finally, the
third axis reflects the functionality that motivated the protocol and its ability to
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realize its value.
Before detailing the resulting list of features, we first highlight two key properties
we enforce to facilitate statistical analysis. Specifically, protocol features must be:
(i) Binary39: This is to lower the “noise” inherent when measuring continuous
valued functions.
(ii) Objectively measurable: This is again intended to limit the measurement noise
that arises when subjective assessments are used to set a feature’s value.
4.2.2 Features List
In investigating factors that may be influencing adoption, we consider the following
twenty protocol features:
Protocol Functionality
The concept of layering has played a strong role in the design of communication
protocols, and accordingly layers provide rough boundaries along which to partition
protocols and their functionalities. Additional categories are, however, necessary
to distinguish between protocols with similar functionality but targeting different
users, e.g., end-users vs. the network itself. This led to the formulation of the
following six features or categories under which to classify protocols:
(1) Application (A): Protocols that provide different means of network com-
munication to users, e.g., ssh;
39Categorical features (e.g., protocol type) can be transformed to binary features.
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(2) Transport (T): Protocols that deal with end-to-end connectivity function-
ality, e.g., TCP;
(3) Network Services (S): Protocols that target services that facilitate net-
work use, e.g., DNS;
(4) Network Control Plane (C): Protocols that affect network configuration,
e.g., RSVP;
(5) Network Routing Plane (R): Protocols that determine packet forward-
ing, e.g., BGP;
(6) Network Data Plane (D): Protocols that deal with packet format and
handling, e.g., IPSEC.
Note that this classification omits Link and Physical layer protocols. The pri-
mary reason is that the IETF targets very few protocols in these categories.
Impact or Dependency on Other Protocols
These features capture the impact or dependency of a protocol on other protocols or
network components, as well as its interaction with them. The information needed
to identify them is available from the protocol’s RFC and accompanying documents.
(7) New protocol vs. extension/version of an existing protocol: A
new protocol is a clean design, while an extension/version of a protocol inherits
and/or builds on its predecessor. This creates different adoption challenges, e.g.,
extensions/versions need to interact with an installed-base, while new protocols
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may need to displace a functionally similar protocol.
(8) Replacing another protocol: This applies to new protocols seeking to
replace an existing protocol. Migrating the incumbent’s user-base can be a chal-
lenge.
(9) Requiring changes to other protocols: At times, a protocol requires
changes to other protocols, e.g., TCP’s Explicit Congestion Notification calls for
changes in the IP header. Effecting those changes creates additional adoption hur-
dles.
(10) Generating additional value for other protocols: In some cases, a
protocol adds value to other protocols, e.g., IPSEC offers security to upper layer
protocols. This can facilitate adoption.
(11) Affecting network (hardware or software) components: Support
for a protocol can occasionally require changes to network components, e.g., IPv6
affects router hardware and software. Deploying those changes can delay adoption.
(12) Backward compatibility: This applies to protocol extensions/versions
and reflects whether it can interoperate with earlier versions, e.g., TCP SACK. The
extent to which this holds will likely affect adoption.
Value and its realization
The type of value or functionality behind a protocol’s standardization can also be
expected to play a role in its adoption. We distinguish between three main cate-
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gories, namely, performance, security, and scalability, plus one “catch-all” category.
(13) Performance: This covers features that seek to improve communication
throughput or latency, e.g., as some TCP extensions arguably have.
(14) Security: This includes authentication and encryption aspects, as well as
protocol mechanisms aimed at strengthening communication integrity.
(15) Scalability: Dealing with the growth of the Internet is a key feature in
many protocols, which this seeks to capture.
(16) Others: As alluded to, this is a place-holder for motivations that do not
belong to one of the above three categories.
While the above features identify where the value of a protocol might lie, another
important aspect is realizing this value. In particular, value realization may depend
on the level of adoption of a protocol. For example, does value grow with adoption,
and if yes, how? We distinguish between four different scenarios.
(17) Local: Full value is realized even under limited (individual) adoption.
Mobile IP can, for example, be argued to fall in this category. Such a feature is
expected to facilitate adoption.
(18) Domain-wide: Adoption within the realm of a single management entity,
e.g., an Autonomous System, is sufficient to unlock the protocol’s value. This is
common with intra-domain routing protocols.
(19) Internet-wide: Realizing the bulk of the protocol’s value calls for widespread
adoption, e.g., as is the case with IPv6. Such a constraint can be expected to make
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adoption more challenging.
(20) Increasing: The value of many protocols increases with adoption, e.g.,
the benefits of DNSSEC grow, the more widely adopted it is. The ability to pro-
gressively realize value may foster adoption.
4.3 Data Collection
The IETF relies on various vehicles to discuss and distribute protocols it seeks to
standardize. Proposed IETF protocols that have reached a certain level of maturity
are typically disseminated through Requests for Comments (RFCs), namely, have
progressed through rounds of discussions in an IETF Working Group (WG), and
been deemed stable and significant enough to warrant formal publication. RFCs
can belong to different categories, and we focus on standards track RFCs. Our
motivation is that they correspond to protocols that are of sound design, so that an
eventual failure to gain widespread adoption is unlikely to stem from fundamental
technical flaws.
We select a representative sample of RFCs in three steps. The first step involves
eliminating all RFCs issued since 2009. This is to ensure that enough time had
elapsed since the protocol’s initial release for a reasonable assessment of its adoption
status. The second step involves eliminating irrelevant RFCs from the above set.
Irrelevant RFCs are those that are not introducing a new protocol or an extension
to a protocol, or are associated with data link and physical layers. The reason we do
129
not consider data link or physical layer protocols is that IETF was not involved in
the standardization of many of the protocols in these two categories, and therefore,
it is unlikely that we can infer anything from the available data. The set of relevant
pre-2009 standards track RFCs is still huge, and characterizing all of them (using
the characteristics defined in the previous section) is infeasible, therefore, we need
to find a representative sample to infer (potential) statistical correlation between
a number of characteristics and the success of protocols. We seek not only to find
such correlations, but to quantify them and find their statistical significance. Hence,
our sample needs to be representative of all types of protocols, regardless of their
popularity, to avoid potential bias in our statistical findings. In other words, our
focus is on finding a sample that is not dominated by popular protocols and the rules
that govern them, so that our findings can be generalized to all kinds of protocols.
Thus, the third step focuses on producing a subset of RFCs for our analysis. This
was performed by combining two different sampling methods, one producing 110
and the other 120 RFCs.
The motivation for using two different sampling methods is to avoid over-
sampling “popular” protocols that tend to see many extensions and correspond-
ingly generate a large number of RFCs, i.e., a simple random sampling tends to
sample popular protocols more often than other protocols, thereby introducing a
bias in our dataset. The first sampling method involves randomly sampling all past
and present IETF WGs and retaining one major pre-2009 RFC from each of the
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sampled WGs (in the rest of the chapter, we refer to this sample as “WG-based”),
producing 120 “major” RFCs. In other words, we select 120 WGs from the total
of 179 WGs that have at least one relevant pre-2009 standards track RFC. Then,
from each WG we select the major RFC it produced, i.e., an RFC that is the most
important one among all the standards track RFCs of that particular WG. This
sampling method gives each major RFC a chance of 120
179
' 67% to be included in
our final dataset. The second sampling method involves selecting 110 RFCs ran-
domly from the non-major RFCs, i.e., any other relevant pre-2009 standards track
RFC that is not in the 179 major RFCs set, and in the rest of this chapter we refer
to the resulting sample as “random”. Since there are a total of 1473 relevant RFCs
that are in the standards track and pre-2009, the second sampling method basically
selects 110 out of 1473-179, giving each RFC in this set a chance of 110
1473−179 ' 8.5%.
We seek to combine these two sample sets to create a larger set that includes all
types of protocols regardless of their popularities. However, we can only combine
these datasets if their statistical differences are not beyond what we intended. In
particular, our goal is to create a sample that is not biased towards popular proto-
cols, i.e., not containing many extensions of a few popular protocols. Therefore, we
used the WG-based method to sample more “new” protocols, i.e., protocols with a
fresh design, even if they are not popular. Except for this feature that we intended
to have, and the ones that are closely associated with it, we want the two samples
(i.e., random and WG-based) to have similar distributions, so that combining them
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into a larger dataset does not create a new statistical bias. In other words, we want
to combine the two datasets if and only if their distributions are not drastically
different (except for those dimensions that we intended to be different, e.g., charac-
teristics related to new protocols). We relegate the tests that shows this similarity
to the end of this section, and here only explain what are the general characteristics
of the final sample.
The final sample is found by mixing the above two samples, and as a result
of our two sampling methods, each relevant RFC has a non-zero (i.e., more than
8.5%) chance of being a part of this mixture. If we have found all 230 RFCs in our
list by simple random sampling, the chance of each relevant RFC being selected
would be exactly 230
1473
= 16%. However, our sampling assigns a higher chance
(67%) to major RFCs, and a lower chance (8.5%) to others. As alluded to earlier,
this is done to avoid the bias (towards more popular protocols) associated with
simple random sampling. In other words, our final dataset is a more representative
sample (compared to a simple random sample of the same size) of all types of RFCs
regardless of their popularity, since it captures a larger range of protocols, and
therefore, we can generalize our findings to a broader set of RFCs.
The next and most time consuming step involved characterizing the protocol
described in each RFC according to the features of Section 4.2, as well as label it
as successful or not. Both are essentially manual processes that involve our own
experience with protocols, together with extensive reliance on a broad range of
132
external sources, e.g., books, technology blogs, source code forums, product web
pages, IETF mailing lists, etc. This process, while lengthy, was to some extent
simplified by the fact that we dealt primarily with binary decisions for each feature.
This mitigated the impact of unavoidable inaccuracy in the information that led
to classifying each protocol as either having or not having a particular feature.
Internal cross-validation was performed between the authors, and the result of our
classification is available for external review (See Appendix D). The results are in
the form of a spreadsheet with each row representing one of the 230 protocols under
consideration, and the columns corresponding to the different features of Section 4.2
in addition to the label of successful vs. not successful. Comments are available for
cells in the spreadsheet that highlight the motivations behind its setting and/or
pointers to documentation used to support the choice that was made.
As protocol functionality arguably represents a natural partitioning, we present
in Table 4.1 classification results for functionality features, as well as the corre-
sponding number of protocols deemed successful in our two samples, random and
WG-based. Complete results are available from the spreadsheet.
A T S C R D Succ.
Random (110) 33 10 26 8 24 9 71
WG-based (120) 32 6 36 15 8 23 64
Table 4.1: Protocol classification statistics
As alluded to earlier, it is important to examine the similarity of our two datasets
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before combining them into a larger dataset. We examined the similarity between
the distributions of our two samples, namely, WG-based and random, by applying
the binomial proportion exact test (i.e., Fisher’s test), each feature. In other words,
for each feature we have two vectors of binary values (with sizes of 110 and 120),
to which we apply the Fisher’s test. The null hypothesis of this test is whether the
two samples are drawn from similar distributions (H0 : p1 = p2), since it is easier
to define such a test compared to a null hypothesis that the two distributions are
different. If the outcomes show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all of
the features (except for those that we intended to be different), then it is reasonable
to assume that combining the two datasets does not create a new bias. In other
words, the ideal outcome is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for most of
the features with a significance level of 95%. The result of the Fisher’s test is a
p− value that basically shows the probability of the two samples being drawn from
the same distribution, i.e., the significance with which the null hypothesis can be
rejected is found by “1 - p-value”. These p − values are listed for each feature in
Table 4.2. The rows labeled “Feature” list the corresponding feature on which the
test was performed, and the rows below them (labeled “p-value”) show the p-values
of the Fisher’s test.
It can be seen that as of the RFCs’ labels, i.e., being successful or not, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis with 95% significance (p−value = 0.107). In other
words, we cannot claim that the two sampling methods produce datasets that have
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different distributions when it comes to success or failure of protocols. According
to the results listed in Table 4.2 the above claim is true for all other features except
for 4 of them, namely, being a new protocol, generating additional value for other
protocols, being a Routing protocol, and being a Data plane protocol.
Among these 4 features, “being a new protocol” is the most important, since
the rest of the differences are mostly associated with it (see below). By examining
the datasets, we realized that the WG-based sampling produces more new protocols
than the random sampling method, which as alluded to earlier, is what we expected
to happen, i.e., more protocols with fresh designs are going to be present in this
dataset compared to the random sample.
The rest of the differences are mainly associated with being a new protocol
and how the RFCs are distributed. For instance, new protocols mainly generate
additional value for other protocols, compared to extensions of existing protocols
that mostly generate value for their parent protocols. Therefore, since the WG-
based sampling generates more new protocols, the “generating additional value for
other protocols” feature has a higher proportion in this dataset compared to the
random sample. Also, the difference between the proportion of the routing protocols
in the two samples comes from the fact that there are a few new routing protocols in
the IETF standards, and they are mainly popular, therefore, the random sampling
selects more of them (i.e., extensions of those popular protocols) compared to the
WG-based sampling. Finally, the difference between the proportion of the Data
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plane protocols between the two samples is due to having a large number of major
data plane RFCs (fresh designs) from various WGs, which results in more of them
being selected by the WG-based sampling.
The results of the above tests show that despite the different sampling methods,
and the slight differences in the datasets that they produce (which were intentional
to avoid the bias toward more popular protocols), the two datasets, namely, WG-
based and random, do not have drastically different distributions. Moreover, as we
explain in the next section, we categorize RFCs based on their functionalities (and
being new or not for some categories) before applying the classification methods
to them, and as a result, the slight differences mentioned above do not affect our
findings. In other words, not only the mixture is a more representative sample of
all types of protocols (regardless of their popularities), but also, according to the
results of the Fisher’s test, it does not introduce a new bias that affects our final
findings.
Feature Succ. A T S C R D
p-value 0.107 0.660 0.301 0.301 0.271 0.001 0.021
Feature New Replace backwards Net. Gear Local Domain Internet
p-value 0.000 0.107 0.186 0.891 0.445 0.884 1.000
Feature Increase Change Gen Value Secur. Scala. Perf. Other
p-value 0.787 0.787 0.013 0.623 0.350 0.508 0.515
Table 4.2: Results of Binomial Proportion Tests for Sample Distribution Similarity
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4.4 Methodology
Given our relatively small dataset and our goal to identify features that play a major
role in a protocol’s adoption, we considered statistical methods such as logistic re-
gression, decision trees, or Logistic Model Trees (LMT), instead of less-transparent
and more data demanding algorithms such as neural networks or K-nearest neigh-
bor [89]. Among those initial choices, we finally settled on binary logistic regres-
sion40, since our focus is on the interpretability of the results (i.e., regression is more
transparent in terms of which factors/features are significant, and in quantifying
their relative effects).
The relatively large number of features on which we rely to characterize protocols
(see Section 4.2), leads us to first use stepwise regression to isolate features (a model)
with the highest classification impact. Stepwise regression adds features one-by-one
in its forward mode and removes them, also one-by-one, in its backward mode,
and at each step examines whether a particular criterion, e.g., Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [10], is minimized41. In
our analysis, we focus on AIC (essentially a measure of the model’s quality based
on a trade-off between its goodness of fit and its complexity), as it proved the most
40“The binary logistic model is used to predict a binary response based on one or more predictor
variables (features), making it a probabilistic classification model in the parlance of machine
learning” [1].
41We also considered p-value thresholds, which enters (removes) a feature to (from) the model
only if its significance meets the “enter” or “leave” thresholds.
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efficient in selecting a model. Results for BIC and other criteria were, however,
qualitatively similar.
Once key features have been identified, we feed them to the binary logistic
regression method. In our investigation, a positive (negative) outcome of this
method corresponds to an RFC classified as successful (unsuccessful). We rely
on JMP 12 (http://www.jmp.com) for stepwise regression and binary logistic re-
gression, and for the statistics it provides to characterize the outcome of the classi-
fication. Weka 3-7-12 (http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/) is used in turn
for cross-validation (see below) as well as to generate a confusion matrix. Because of
our relatively small data set (and/or large number of features), we can face a quasi-
separation problem. In other words, the model overfits to the dataset, meaning that
it memorizes the data instead of learning the relationship between the response and
the features, and therefore, the model coefficients are mostly not statistically sig-
nificant, which makes the model provide less value in terms of classification. When
faced with such a scenario, we rely on built-in regularization tools provided by Weka
and JMP, namely, Ridge Regression and Firth Bias-Adjusted Regression, to avoid
overfitting.
The outcomes identify which features play important roles in a protocol’s success
or failure through two main metrics, odds ratio and statistical significance (i.e.,
p-value). The odds ratio captures the odds that an outcome occurs given the
presence of a particular feature, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring
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in the absence of that feature — odds ratio values less (greater) than 1 imply
the existence of a negative (positive) correlation. The statistical significance of
each feature is characterized through a likelihood ratio test. This test compares
the model’s likelihood with that of an alternative model from which the feature
is absent. The p-value is then obtained assuming a χ2 distribution for the test
statistic. The smaller the p-value, the less likely the alternative model from which
the feature is absent42.
The likelihood ratio test is based on a number of assumptions, namely, samples
must be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), and the sample size must
be large. The first two conditions (i.i.d) are met in our data, however, the last one
is not, i.e., we are dealing with small data. Having a large sample is required to
make the approximation of the test statistics follow a χ2 distribution, according to
Wilk’s theorem [88], and only if those assumptions are met the resulting p-values
are accurate. The theorem shows that using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT)
we can ensure the normality of our test statistic, and then using an approximation
with an error of O( 1√
n
) (where n is the sample size), we can find the p-value using
the χ2 distribution [7]. Therefore, the measure of large sample here is whether
the error of O( 1√
n
) is small enough to be ignored in the chi-squared distribution
approximation, i.e., whether the distribution is asymptotically χ2. Since our data
is being categorized later to 7 categories (see section 4.5), and each category has
42We target a significance ≥ 95%, i.e., a p-value ≤ 0.05.
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Even though the exact error also depends on other terms in O( 1√
n
) (where n is
the size of the sample fed to the logistic regression model), the approximation is
potentially not accurate. However, there are studies [7,52,74,92] that show not only
there are ways of mitigating this error, but also the likelihood ratio test is relatively
accurate in certain situations. Among these studies, [66, 81, 84] suggest with 5 to
20 samples per predictor variable, the asymptotic approximations become close to
accurate, i.e., the likelihood ratio test gives close-to-accurate p-values.
The settings in these studies are applicable to our case, since the only assump-
tions they have are as follows: (i) the outcomes are binary (therefore the underlying
distribution under the null hypothesis is binomial or multinomial), (ii) the sample
size is small (between 5 to 40), and (iii) the samples are i.i.d. Therefore, we can
reasonably assume that, in our study, applying logistic regression to the datasets
and obtaining the p-values using the chi-squared approximation does not yield to
completely wrong or far-from-accurate outcomes.
However, we also use another approach called Exact Logistic Regression (ELR)
[36,55], which basically gives exact p-values for small datasets. This method is based
on permutational distributions of sufficient statistics, and does not have any asymp-
totic conditions or requirements The only assumption of this method is (except for
i.i.d. samples) that we are interested in the inferences of certain parameters and
consider the “intercept” as a nuisance parameter. Then, ELR finds the conditional
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likelihood function of the “parameters of interest”, and using a permutational dis-
tribution of their sufficient statistics, calculates the exact inferences (i.e., p-values).
This method was not used until recently due to the lack of efficient algorithms to
compute the exact p-values, however, with the development of better algorithms,
it is now considered a popular method (even though many statisticians regard it as
too conservative in terms of finding p-values). Even though this method is an exact
way of obtaining the p-values, we still report the results of the unconditional logistic
regression method, since it is almost infeasible (using the machines and algorithms
that are available), to apply the ELR method to datasets with (roughly) more than
60 samples and large number of features (it requires more than 260 operations).
The odds ratio and p-value reflect our focus on identifying features likely to play
an important role in a protocol’s success, rather than develop a “predictor” for a
protocol’s eventual success. However, we also consider metrics that evaluate the
model’s predictive accuracy.
The first is the 5-fold cross-validation accuracy [50]. 5-fold cross-validation ran-
domly divides the dataset into 5 equal subsets, and uses each subset as a test set,
with the other four used to train the classifier. The classification rates on each test
set are averaged to build the 5-fold cross-validation classification accuracy.
Another relevant metric is the “confusion matrix” that consists of True Positive
(TP), False Negative (FN), True Negative (TN), and False Positive (FP) rates. It
measures the classifier’s ability to correctly identify successful and unsuccessful pro-
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tocols. TP (TN) is the fraction of successful (unsuccessful) RFCs properly classified.
Conversely, FP (FN) is the fraction of unsuccessful (successful) RFCs classified as
successful (unsuccessful).
4.5 Results
This section reports results from applying the classification of Section 4.4 to the
230 RFCs in our data set.
The (random) sampling process that generated our 230 RFCs, arguably resulted
in a disparate set of protocols. This reflects protocol diversity, but makes it unlikely
that the same features are behind the success (or failure) of each one of those 230
protocols. This begs the question of whether seeking to identify a common set of
features is meaningful in the first place. And if not, how should we instead group
protocols?
We explored this issue by first applying our classifier to the full set of 230 proto-
cols, and then separately to new and extensions or new versions of existing protocols.
The results are presented in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, respectively, with rows listing
the features identified by the stepwise regression, and for each feature highlighting
its odds ratio (OR) and statistical significance (p-value) obtained through uncon-
ditional logistic regression. The reason we do not apply ELR to these datasets is
their large sizes and the large number of features. For instance, for the case of all
RFCs, applying ELR requires about 2230 operations, which is simply not feasible.
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The last two rows report the 5-fold cross validation accuracy (Accuracy) and the
confusion matrix. Stepwise regression generated a relatively large set (10) of “rele-
vant” features when applied to all protocols, but only 5 features for existing and new
protocols. The large number of features for these three categories is consistent with
our expectations given the underlying protocol diversity, and makes interpreting
the results difficult.
Odds ratios were middling (mostly in the 2-10 range for positive correlations, and
similarly for negative correlations), but improved slightly when separating protocols
into new and existing versions. A similar pattern was observed for p-values. A few
values fell below the target 95% confidence, and separating protocols into new and
existing again produced minor improvements.
This motivated grouping protocols into more consistent sets, whose success
would then more likely depend on similar features. A natural grouping is along
a protocol’s functionality, or closely aligned with it43. We rely on such a grouping,
and report next the results of our classification for each group. Results for the
first two groups are split between new and existing protocols, but aggregated for
the last three groups primarily because they include too few protocols (something
that should be addressed in future works). The results of the unconditional (or
Firth Bias-Adjusted44) logistic regression and the exact logistic regression (ELR)
43As a sanity check, “arbitrary” groupings were investigated, and consistently yielded poorer
outcomes.
44As alluded to earlier, when facing complete or quasi-complete separation problem in our data,
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Feature OR p-value
Protocol type=A 2.17 0.054
Protocol type=R 3.11 0.038
Backward compatible 2.75 0.001
Affect net. gear 0.20 0.001
DomainWide 2.28 0.060
Changes Other Protocols 0.21 0.020
Gen. value for other protocols 3.47 0.000
Security motivated 0.50 0.074
Scalability 3.21 0.064





Table 4.3: All protocols (230 RFCs)
are presented in the form of tables with rows listing the features identified by step-
wise regression, and for each feature highlighting its odds ratio (ORu, obtained
from the unconditional or Firth Bias-Adjusted logistic regression method), approx-
imated statistical significance (“L-R p-value”, obtained from the Likelihood Ratio




Protocol type=A 5.19 0.019
DomainWide 4.27 0.059
Changes Other Protocols 0.09 0.032




TP= 0.72 FN= 0.28
TN=0.82 FP= 0.18
Table 4.4: New protocols (78 RFCs)
Feature OR p-value
Protocol type=R 6.83 0.002
Backward compatible 3.65 0.011





TP= 0.85 FN= 0.15
TN=0.48 FP= 0.52
Table 4.5: Existing protocols (152 RFCs)
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test), conditional odds ratio (ORc, obtained from the ELR method), and the exact
statistical significance (“Exact p-value”, obtained from the ELR method). The last
two rows report the 5-fold cross validation accuracy (Accuracy) and the confusion
matrix.
Finally, we also perform another test using the ELR method to roughly compare
its outcomes with the stepwise regression method (even if this is not a fair compar-
ison). The test involves using each of the features in a single-variable model and
investigate its correlation with success or failure of the protocols. This is basically
examining the impact of each feature on success of a protocol, regardless of other
features. The outcomes are p− values that show the significance of those potential
correlations, and if the features that are found to be significantly correlated match
those identified by the stepwise regression, we have a rough validation of the step-
wise regression’s outcome. We also report on the results of this test for each of our
categories.
4.5.1 Application & Transport Layer Protocols
Our first group combines application and transport layer protocols. They share
many properties, e.g., both reside primarily in end-systems, but more particularly,
among the twenty features we consider, they have in common the fact that their
value usually increases with adoption. This is rarely the case with other types of
protocols. Results are reported in Table 4.6 for new protocols and Table 4.7 for
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existing protocols.
Uncond. Logistic Regression Exact Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value





Table 4.6: New application & transport protocols (28 RFCs)
Table 4.6 highlights a point that adding value to other protocols is the single
most important factor behind the success of a new application or transport layer
protocol. In hindsight, this may be intuitive for transport protocols which need to
demonstrate value to applications (and application protocols) to be adopted. This
is less so for application layer protocols, though many still end-up interacting with
other application layer protocols; in the process potentially contributing value to
those protocols. Note also that the importance of this feature does not mean that
it is a necessary condition for a protocol’s success. As a matter of fact, the high FN
value indicates that close to 30% of successful protocols did not have this property.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that this feature plays an important role in the
eventual success of a new application or transport protocol.
It can be seen that the odds ratios obtained from the unconditional logistic
regression and the exact logistic regression are close, and the approximation of the
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p-values obtained from the likelihood ratio test is also close to the exact p-values.
This highlights the fact that our initial approach of approximating the p-values
does not create a large error, even though we are dealing with small data, which is
aligned with the findings of the other studies (note that we have about 28 events
per predictor variable). Another finding is that the p − values generated by the
ELR method also only identify “Generating value for other protocols” as significant.
This is aligned with the outcome of the stepwise regression method we use to select
features.
Uncond. Logistic Regression Exact Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Backwards compatibility 15.59 0.003 13.66 0.012
Security 0.17 0.038 0.18 0.096
Accuracy 79.3%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.95 FN= 0.05
TN=0.25 FP= 0.75
Table 4.7: Extensions/versions of existing application & transport protocols (53
RFCs)
Results for existing A & T protocols are presented in Table 4.7. They show
that backward compatibility and targeting a security extension influence success
positively and negatively, respectively. Both are relatively intuitive. We expect
backward compatibility to be important for all existing protocols. Conversely, we
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know from experience, e.g., [65], the struggles that security-motivated protocols
commonly face. We also note that accuracy and TP rates are higher than for new
protocols, but not so are FP rates. In other words, fewer successful protocols don’t
have either feature, but having those features is by itself not a guarantee of success.
In other words, the features are likely necessary but far from sufficient for success.
The table also shows that even though the odds ratios obtained from the two
logistic regression methods for these two features are very close, their p − values
are slightly different. As alluded to in the previous section, the p − value from
the exact method is “too conservative”, and therefore, we use them as an upper
bound for significance of the correlation between the corresponding feature and the
success of protocols. With that in mind, the “Security” is not 95% significant, but
is definitely more than 90% significant. This shows that even if the likelihood ratio
test yields to close approximations of the p − values, it involves some errors, and
using ELR we can mitigate those errors and find the accurate p-values. Also, the
90% significance is what we can achieve with this dataset, and it can be obviously
improved with more samples.
In order to validate the outcomes of the stepwise regression method, we also
examined the correlation of individual features with success of the protocols. The
outcome shows that ELR only finds the same features as significantly correlated
with success as the stepwise regression method.
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4.5.2 Network Services Protocols
Network services protocols (S) have many aspects in common with A & T protocols,
and therefore so do their results even if differences exist.
Table 4.8 points again to the need for new S protocols to add value to other
protocols if they are to succeed, and its odds ratio and significance are even stronger
than for A & T protocols. This may be because network services’ primary purpose
is to facilitate network usage, so that offering easier access or added functionality
to other protocols is of even greater importance.
It can be seen that the p − values obtained through the likelihood ratio test
are accurate even though there only 28 samples in our dataset. This one more
time confirms the findings of the small-data studies. Another finding is that ELR
only finds the same set of features to be significantly correlated with success as the
stepwise regression method.
Table 4.9 includes again backward compatibility as the one key feature for exist-
ing S protocols; one that is now present in almost all successful protocols (TP=095),
though not by itself a guarantee of success (FP=0.62). Security is, however, now ab-
sent; maybe because the smaller ecosystem of network services makes the adoption
of security extensions “slightly” less challenging?
The odds ratios and p-values obtained from the two logistic regression methods
almost agree, even if there are slight differences (again, the exact method is too
conservative in claiming significance). This is another confirmation of the studies
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that claim having about 20 samples per predictor is enough for reasonable approx-
imations of the p− values obtained from the likelihood ratio test.
Additionally, upon examining whether the ELR method identifies other features
than the one identified by the stepwise regression method, we realized that when
“affecting network gear” is used as the single predictor variable in the ELR model,
it is found to be somewhat significant (p − value = 0.070). However, backward
compatibility is the only one that passes the 95% significance level, and when we
use a model including both of these features, namely, backward compatibility and
affecting network gear, their p−values become 0.300 and 0.408, respectively, which
are not significant at all. In other words, this shows that backward compatibility
is the single most significant feature correlated with the success of existing network
services protocols, and this validates the outcome of the stepwise regression method.
Uncond. Logistic Regression Exact Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Gen. value for others 77.00 0.000 57.54 0.000
Accuracy 89.3%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.93 FN= 0.07
TN=0.85 FP= 0.15
Table 4.8: New network services protocols (28 RFCs)
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4.5.3 Network Control Plane Protocols
Network control plane (C) protocols differ from network services protocols primarily
in that they target the network as opposed to network users. So while both share
close ties to the network, their success can be affected by different features, as
reported in Table 4.10.
The table identifies “domain-wide value,” i.e., the protocol’s ability to realize
Uncond. Logistic Regression Exact Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Backwards Compatibility 10.80 0.014 10.10 0.049
Accuracy 68.6%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.95 FN= 0.05
TN=0.38 FP= 0.62
Table 4.9: Extensions/versions of existing network services protocols (35 RFCs)
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its full value once adopted in a given domain, as an important factor in a proto-
col’s success. This aligns with our intuition that deploying protocols that “touch”
network devices is easier when their scope is limited (to a domain). The second
feature, “Generating additional value for other protocols,” is also consistent with
the notion that network control functions that benefit other protocols should have
an easier time being adopted.
The odds ratios and p− values obtained by the two methods are not in agree-
ment, even if they are close. This is due to the separation problem in our small
sample size, which forced the use of Firth Bias-Adjusted regression (as the first
method) instead of the unconditional logistic regression. Also, the small sample
size barely meets the rule of thumb for minimum sample size of 5 to 20 samples per
predictor (i.e., 23 samples and 2 predictors). As a result, we have to rely on the
exact method for inferences. The p-value of the two features are upper bounded
by 0.056, meaning that we can draw a conclusion that both features are correlated
with the success of network control plane protocols with a significance level of about
95% (94% to be accurate).
We used the ELR method to find the correlation of each individual feature
with success of protocols. The outcome shows that this method only identifies
the same set of features to be significantly correlated with success of protocols as
the stepwise regression method does, i.e., validates the outcomes of the stepwise
regression method.
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Firth Bias-Adjusted Exact Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Domain-wide value 24.64 0.008 9.78 0.056
Gen. value for other protocols 10.23 0.012 13.52 0.046
Accuracy 82.6%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.7 FN= 0.30
TN=0.92 FP= 0.08
Table 4.10: Network control plane protocols (23 RFCs)
4.5.4 Network Routing Protocols
Network routing protocols (R) include intra- and inter-domain protocols. Given
the small number of RFCs involved, a single set of results is again presented, in
Table 4.11, for all protocols in this category. Backward compatibility emerges again
as a key feature, in part because there are few “new” protocols in this category.
Another feature is “replacing another protocol,” which is likely a reflection of the
fact that most routing protocols have had multiple versions, with each new version
replacing the previous one. Finally, “domain-wide value” is also identified as impor-
tant, but with a negative impact. Its selection is somewhat ambiguous and appears
driven in part by the fact that a number of intra-domain extensions did not succeed.
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This may, however, change as we extend the number of RFCs under consideration,
and may also be caused by “transient noise” in our labeling process45. In particular,
most protocols associated with IPv6 have been marked as “not successful” to reflect
the fact that IPv6 itself has not (yet) succeeded. This situation is, however, fast
changing, as we explained in Chapter 2.
The statistics associated with these features and obtained from the two logistic
regression methods demonstrate some differences. This is mainly due to the fact
that, again, the odds ratios and p − values of the first method are obtained using
Firth Bias-Adjusted (since there is a separation problem in the data). Also again,
the rule of thumb for minimum number of samples (5 to 20 samples per predictor
variable) is barely met, i.e., we have 32 samples and 3 predictors. This means
that the statistics obtained from the exact method are more trustworthy/accurate.
However, the positive finding is that the odds ratios and p−values obtained from the
exact method show that these features are all (positively or negatively) correlated
with success of network routing protocols with a significance level of 95%.
Moreover, when comparing the ELR and stepwise regression in identifying fea-
tures with significant correlation with success, we realized that the ELR method
finds being a new protocol to be negatively correlated (with a significance of 0.067)
with success of network routing protocols, however, this is true only when this fea-
ture is selected as the single independent variable in the model. In other words,
45Something that is unavoidable given that our sampling is punctual, and a protocol’s success
evolves over time.
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upon including this feature in the above model (in addition to Backward compati-
bility, Replacing another protocol, and Domain wide value realization), all of their
significances drop. This shows that the model identified by the stepwise regression
method includes the minimal set of features that are significantly correlated with
success of protocols.
Firth Bias-Adjusted Exact Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Backwards compatibility 99.46 0.000 28.00 0.006
Replacing another protocol 78.80 0.002 15.69 0.023
Domain-wide value 0.076 0.009 0.13 0.050
Accuracy 65.6%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.86 FN= 0.14
TN=0.27 FP= 0.73
Table 4.11: R protocols (32 RFCs)
4.5.5 Network Data Plane Protocols
Table 4.12 reports results for network data plane protocols (D) and singles out “per-
formance improvement,” as correlated with success. This aligns with our intuition
156
that performance is of utmost importance in the data plane, so that protocols that
offer performance improvements stand a stronger chance of success.
The odds ratios obtained from the two different logistic methods are very close,
however, the exact method identifies a p-value that is slightly higher than the
unconditional method. The significance of this single feature is upper bounded
by 0.52, which is slightly less than the 95% level of significance, and this is most
probably associated with our small sample size. Additionally, the exact method
only identifies “Performance” as significantly correlated with success of network
data plane protocols (as does the stepwise regression method).
Uncond. Logistic Regression Exact Logistic Regression
Feature ORu L-R p-value ORc Exact p-value
Performance Motivated 7.50 0.018 6.98 0.052
Accuracy 71.0%
Confusion Matrix
TP= 0.50 FN= 0.50
TN=0.88 FP= 0.12
Table 4.12: network data plane protocols (31 RFCs)
Comparing the results from the above classifications with those associated with
all 230 RFCs, all new, or all existing protocols, shows that generally the accuracies,
p-values, and ORs improved. Additionally, fewer features were selected for each
category, making the results more interpretable. Moreover, the approximations of
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the likelihood ratio test are shown to be close to the exact p-values for the small
sample sizes, and therefore, trustworthy. Finally, we (roughly) validated that the
outcomes of the stepwise regression method and our naive test using the ELR
method always agree.
4.6 Validation
In order to further validate our findings, we constructed a new dataset from a
(somewhat) different category of RFCs, namely, “Experimental”. These RFCs have
become mature enough to be promoted to an “Experimental” status, but the IETF
has decided that they do not meet certain requirements to be promoted further to
the standards track. The goal of this section is to examine this decision making
process and understand whether it is consistent with the decisions to promote other
RFCs to the standards track. In other words, we seek to understand whether the
decision rules that decide the fate of these RFCs is similar to the one that promoted
other RFCs to proposed standard and above.
Our sampling process is simple random, since we are not aware of differences in
popularity of Experimental RFCs. The labeling process is similar to what we used
in Section 4.3. Then we apply the models associated with each category of RFCs
defined in Section 4.5.
The results vary across different types of protocols, but are mostly consistent
with our intuition. In particular, the models show 100% accuracy across two cat-
158
egories, namely, network data plane and network control plane RFCs. In other
words, we confirm that the factors associated with success or failure of “Proposed
Standard” RFCs, are also correlated with the failure of “Experimental” RFCs. For
other categories, however, the accuracies are not necessarily as high as the previ-
ous two categories. Specifically, for all of the other categories, the accuracies are
at 65%, which is slightly lower than those of the models developed in Section 4.5.
These findings show that the vetting process of the IETF is at the very least not
different when deciding to promote and RFC to the standards track or not. In
other words, the WG members were mostly consistent in deciding what protocols
are good enough to move towards becoming a standard and what protocols are not
mature enough, and need to be published with the Experimental status. Also, it
shows how our models can be extended to other categories of RFCs, even if they
are trained by an arguably different set.
4.7 Conclusions, Limitations & Future Works
This study investigates, using statistical tools, the correlation between a number of
factors and success or failure of protocols that have reached the status of proposed
standard or higher within the IETF. It shows how incorporating our engineering
intuition in the process helps identify key features correlated with success or failure
of protocols. The outcomes of the methodology are models that provide accuracies
between 70% to 85%, with only a small number of features (between 1 to 3) for
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almost all categories of RFCs. Also, the findings confirm a number of intuitive
results, as well as (interesting) insight into the impact of less expected features that
our engineering intuition could not afford on its own.
There are however, some limitations and shortcomings associated with our
methodology and findings. In particular, the small sample sizes can potentially
affect not only the accuracy of the classifiers, but also the p-value approximations
requiring large samples, e.g., likelihood ratio test. This is to some extent addressed
by using an exact logistic regression method, and showing that the approximations
are relatively accurate. However, as a future work direction, we seek to expand
the dataset in cases where there are only a small number of samples and the clas-
sifier accuracy is low, e.g., routing protocols, and possibly improve the statistical
significance of our results.
Another potential limitation is that the accuracy of the classifier does not exceed
85%, which can be due to not including a critical factor in our study. We are open
to considering additional factors in our future works given that they meet the cri-
teria defined in Section 4.2, however, it is also likely that the adoption of a protocol
depends on subtle factors that are hard, if not impossible, to measure, e.g., commer-
cial interest from companies, involvement of influential people in standardization,
etc.
Moreover, we acknowledge that our study shows correlations between success
or failure of a protocol and a number of features, however, correlation does not
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guarantee causality. In other words, we do not claim that the existence or lack of
the features shown in Section 4.5 cause success or failure. Establishing a causal
relationship is much harder, and requires randomized experiments, etc., which can
be investigated in future research.
Another potential shortcoming is the lack of a separate validation/test dataset,
which can further confirm the outcomes. This is a direction we seek to explore
in the future. In particular, by constructing a dataset from another category of
RFCs, namely, those that were stopped at the Experimental stage by the IETF.
This dataset not only enables us to further validate our results, but also creates
a means to examine the consistency of the IETF decision making in identifying
winning and losing proposals, i.e., IETF has identified the RFCs in this dataset
as “not good enough” to be promoted to the standards track, now this analysis
allows us to compare those decisions with the ones that were indeed promoted to
the standards track.
Finally, we seek to explore the robustness of our findings to other classification
methods. Therefore, another future works direction can include examining non
linear combination of features and using new classifiers.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
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5.1 Conclusions
The focus of this dissertation is on understanding how and why different factors af-
fect the adoption of a network technology. To achieve this goal, we investigate three
problems, in the context of the Internet protocols. Initially, we specifically focus
on IPv6, as the arguably the most important instance of protocol adoption in the
Internet’s history. Then learning from that case study, we extend our investigation
to cover a more general Internet protocol. Our contributions involve developing
methodologies for investigating the adoption of network protocols. These method-
ologies include developing measurement tools, models, and statistical hypotheses.
The first part of the thesis investigates the adoption of IPv6 and the path of
its progress over the last two decades. It identifies the key stakeholders and deci-
sion makers that affect the evolution of IPv6 adoption. In particular, ISPs, ICPs,
ITDs, and users are shown to be involved in the adoption of IPv6, either as deci-
sion makers, or as consumers of the technology. It also identifies using empirical
measurements done by us and others, a 3-phase adoption pattern across different
Internet stakeholders. Then it connects those phases to various factors and deci-
sions made by the key Internet stakeholders. Finally, it develops a simple model
to validate the causal relationship between the changes in those factors, and the 3
phases of IPv6 adoption. The models, and the measurement methodologies can be
used in other similar technology adoption instances.
The second part of the thesis focuses on the future of IPv6 adoption, and how
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different scenarios can speed up or derail its progress. The investigations involve a
number of representative scenarios, and Internet stakeholders. It captures the de-
cision making process of those Internet stakeholders and the interactions between
them. The findings show that in scenarios where ISPs do not agree to offer IPv6
immediately to their users, a race to attract users can lead to a non-predictable and
haphazard IPv6 adoption dynamics. However, the scenarios which include ISPs
that have a minimal coordination, namely, all offer IPv6 as one of their connectiv-
ity options, the adoption picture becomes clear. Even though the latter scenarios
do not offer any guarantee of IPv6 adoption, they create an environment where the
impact of different factors become clear, therefore, help the Internet stakeholders to
devise strategies. The study also investigates the role of address translation mecha-
nisms, as well as the costs of translation and acquisition of extra IPv4 addresses on
the adoption of IPv6. In particular, the study highlights an unintuitive and surpris-
ing finding, namely, that improvements in the performance of address translation
devices can derail the progress of IPv6 adoption.
The above studies raise a question about the adoption dynamics of other pro-
tocols (or network technologies), and the impact of various factors on them. This
endeavor is documented as the third part of this thesis. The study focuses on the
protocols in the standards track of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
First, we collect data to properly characterize those protocols using a number of
features. Then, each protocol is labeled as successful or not. Finally, using statis-
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tical tools, such as binary logistic regression, the correlation between the success
of a protocol and the features that characterize them is investigated. This reveals
a number of intuitive findings as well as some less expected ones. In particular,
the findings confirm a number of anecdotal evidences, such as the positive impact
of backward compatibility on the adoption of a protocol extension or version, or
the negative impact of security as the motivation of a protocol. However, they also
provide new insight on how generating additional value boosts the success of a new
protocol, or how belonging to a specific protocol type/functionality changes the
dynamics of adoption. In addition to providing the insight and formally confirm-
ing a number of anecdotal evidence about protocol adoption, the study develops
a framework and a methodology on how to use statistical tools to understand the
dynamics of a (general) technology adoption.
Next, we propose directions and potential future works that can improve the
models and frameworks developed in this dissertation.
5.2 Potential Extensions
The research in network technology adoption is thriving along several directions.
In this work we investigated the factors and features that govern the adoption of
a general Internet protocol, as well as a case study of IPv6. Each of these studies
have the potential for several interesting extensions as we discuss next.
In the context of IPv6 adoption, it is in particular, interesting to extend the
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measurement study we started in 2009, to other services that are not necessarily
provided on the Web, e.g., P2P applications, mobile apps, etc. This can include
developing apps that monitor other applications on a device for IPv6 usage, and
record their performance. Moreover, developing models that capture the evolution
of IPv6 adoption with greater details, and that have a predictive power is another
interesting investigation direction. In the context of modeling the future scenarios
of IPv6 adoption, the models can be extended to include strategic behaviors for
different Internet stakeholders, instead of myopic ones. Also, those models can all
be extended to capture a general technology adoption instance by tweaking the
parameters, and interactions between the stakeholders.
There are also several extensions possible for investigating the factors or features
that are correlated with the success or failure of a protocol. Generally, expanding the
dataset, and providing a separate test set for further validation of the findings are
useful, even if not utterly necessary given the high significance we obtain through the
current dataset. Additionally, our study does not guarantee any causal relationships
between the features and the outcomes, which can be extended to achieve such
powers using models and/or statistical methods. Moreover, the impact of other
classification methods can be investigated to obtain possible other insight into the
problem. These methods include Decision Trees, Logistic Model Trees (LMT), K-
Nearest-Neighbor, etc.
The findings, models, frameworks, and methodologies of this thesis contribute
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not only to the networking and adoption dynamics research, but also to the re-
search in economics, decision making, and the two sided markets. The studies also
spur further research in the fields of network technology adoption, network tech-
nology design, decision making analysis, network economics etc., and provide new





Disagreement Scenario — IPv6
vs. Private IPv4
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In this scenario, one ISP offers IPv6 addresses to new users, while the other
relies on private IPv4 addresses. Both require translation (IPv6↔IPv4 and Private
IPv4↔Public IPv4) to communicate with the public IPv4 Internet. Both types of
translation equally affect connectivity quality, as measured by a common parameter,
a. The greater maturity of Private to Public IPv4 translation benefits a Private IPv4
solution, since D4 ≤ D6. On the flip side, IPv6 users incur translation penalties
only for the fraction γ6 of ICPs not yet IPv6 accessible.
As with the scenario of IPv6 vs. Public IPv4 (3.4.1), we describe next the de-
cision process of users and ICPs, and how the two ISPs select their prices. For
simplicity, and unlike the previous scenario where existing (public IPv4) users also
had the option to adopt IPv6, we assume that only new users decide on which
connectivity option to choose. Allowing existing (public IPv4) users to make such
a choice requires pricing a third option (public IPv4), which adds significant com-
plexity without qualitatively affecting the results.
A.0.1 Decision Mechanism & Solution
After the two ISPs announce prices of p6 and pp4, (new) users choose an ISP as per




4 denote the fraction of users choosing
IPv6 or private IPv4 addresses in round i, respectively. In particular, a user with
quality sensitivity σ prefers IPv6 over private IPv4 if 1−p6−σaγ(i−1)6 ≥ 1−pp4−σa.
Note that since γ
(i−1)
6 ≤ 1, this implies that prices verify pp4 ≤ p6. Note also, that it
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is possible that there exists a value σNA such that for σ ≥ σNA, 1−p6−σaγ(i−1)6 ≤ 0,
i.e., users that are very sensitive to connectivity impairment will altogether opt out
of connecting to the Internet. This can also arise in the previous scenario, albeit
much more rarely as the availability of the public IPv4 option typically ensures that











































& p6 > 1− aγ(i−1)6






Once users have selected their connectivity option, ICPs proceed with their





46It arises only for combinations of large C and D6 values, i.e., very high acquisition costs for


























& p6 > 1− aγ(i−1)6









{(1 + iδ)(σp4)pp4 −D4σp4(1 + iδ)} (A.0.5)
p6 = argmax
p6
{(1 + iδ)σ6p6 −D6σ6(1 + iδ)γ(i)6 } (A.0.6)
Solving Eq. (A.0.5) requires an optimization with respect to the conditions of
Eq. (A.0.4), however, those conditions are cumbersome, hence, we resort to numer-
ical analysis.
The Impact of Disagreement: Fig. A.1 offers a perspective similar to that
of Fig. 3.2, and reports the outcome of the ISPs’ price selection process for a range
of configurations. There are some differences, e.g., migration to IPv6 arises rarely,
but there is nevertheless a broad range of parameters for which cycle are present.
As argued earlier, this makes devising pricing strategies difficult and is likely to
contribute continued uncertainty in deciding how to settle on a migration strategy.
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c 6 a Migration to IPv6
Cycles
Co-Existence
Figure A.1: IPv6 vs. private IPv4 competition
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Appendix B
Robustness Tests — Figures
174
Here, we present a set of figures similar to Fig. 3.4 for the robustness tests of
Section 3.6. These figures show that despite slight quantitative differences intro-
duced by various assumptions in the model, the outcomes are qualitatively similar
to the original solution of Section 3.4.













































































Figure B.1: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for small C — single-modal β
















































































Figure B.2: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for small C — single-modal σ
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Figure B.3: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for small C — Linear IPv4
acquisition cost














































































Figure B.4: Total profit, discount & adoption levels for small C — Decreasing c6
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Appendix C
ICPs Lag Behind Users & ISPs
177
Here, we investigate a model in which the timing of ICPs’ decisions is different
from that of the ISPs and users. In other words, ICPs less frequently make decisions
compared to the ISPs and users. From a modeling standpoint, we can remove the
decision making of ICPs, and update the fraction of IPv6 accessible ICPs infre-
quently. In this setting, we can analytically find the Nash Equilibrium of the game
played by ISPs (in a disagreement scenario).
This setting is analytically similar to the one where ICPs make decisions after
each price announcement, but the timing of their decision making remains unknown
to ISPs. The model formulation remains the same (as the original model of Section
3.3), except for the IPv6 ISP’s utility function, which instead of γ
(i)
6 uses the previous
fraction of IPv4-only ICPs (γ
(i−1)
6 ). In other words, instead of predicting what ICPs
will do after announcement of prices, the IPv6 ISP uses the known number of IPv6-







⇒ n6 = sσ , n4 = s(1− σ)
f(p4) = n4p4 − C(n4 − 1)2+
g(p6) = n6p6 −D6n6γ(i−1)6



































































where s is the total user population at epoch i, p∗4 and p
∗
6 are the best response
prices of the IPv4 and IPv6 ISPs, respectively. Depending on the values of these
prices, the solution space is divided into three regions:
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Region 1:
0 ≤ p4 ∗ −p6∗ ≤ aγ(i−1)6 & n4 > 1
a > D6 & s ≥ 3a
2a+D6
OR
a < D6 & s ≥ 1 + γ
(i−1)
6 (D6 − a)
2C

















































0 ≤ p4 ∗ −p6∗ ≤ aγ(i−1)6 & n4 ≤ 1
a > D6 & 1 < s <
3a
2a+D6





























a < D6 & 1 < s < 1 +
γ
(i−1)
6 (D6 − a)
2C
In this region, there can be two Nash Equilibria:
p∗4 = p
∗
6 No IPv6 Users
OR
p∗4 − p∗6 ≥ aγ(i−1)6 No IPv4 Users
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Appendix D
RFC Labels and Characteristics
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a.k.a. STD 31 Telnet Timing 5/1/1983 Internet Standar Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 862
a.k.a. STD 20 Echo Protocol 5/1/1983 Internet Standar No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 869 Host Monitorin 12/1/1983 Historic No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 946 Telnet terminal 5/1/1985 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1079 Telnet terminal 12/1/1988 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 1288 The Finger Use 12/1/1991 Draft Standard Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1653 SMTP Service 7/1/1994 Draft Standard Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2077
The Model Pri
Multipurpose I 1/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2221 IMAP4 Login R 10/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2423 VPIM Voice Me 9/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes A No Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2447
iCalendar Mes
Interoperability 11/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2634 Enhanced Sec 6/1/1999 Proposed Stand No A No No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 2920
a.k.a. STD 60 SMTP Service 9/1/2000 Internet Standar Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 2950 Telnet Encrypti 9/1/2000 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No




MIME Message 12/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3207
SMTP Service
SMTP over Tra 2/1/2002 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 3230 Instance Diges 1/1/2002 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 3885 SMTP Service 9/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4254 The Secure Sh 1/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4335 The Secure Sh 1/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4550
Internet Email t
Environments ( 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand No A No No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4932
Extensible Pro





(XMPP) 2/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2746 RSVP Operatio 1/1/2000 Proposed Stand No C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3015 Megaco Protoc 11/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes C No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4761
Virtual Private
Using BGP for 1/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2004 Minimal Encap 10/1/1996 Proposed Stand Yes D Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes No
RFC 3024 Reverse Tunne 1/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3846
Mobile IPv4 Ex
Network Acces 6/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 4311 IPv6 Host-to-R 11/1/2005 Proposed Stand No D No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes No
RFC 5075 IPv6 Router Ad 11/1/2007 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1497 BOOTP Vendor 8/1/1993 Draft Standard Yes S No No Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2138
Remote Authe
(RADIUS) 4/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 2478
The Simple an
GSS-API Negot 12/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2730
Multicast Addr
Allocation Prot 12/1/1999 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No
RFC 2915
The Naming A
DNS Resource 9/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3041
Privacy Extens
Address Autoc 1/1/2001 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
RFC 3111 Service Locati 5/1/2001 Proposed Stand No S No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3262
Reliability of Pr
in Session Initi 6/1/2002 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3326
The Reason He
Session Initiati 12/1/2002 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3779
X.509 Extensio
and AS Identifi 6/1/2004 Proposed Stand No S No No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3845
DNS Security (
(NSEC) RDATA 8/1/2004 Proposed Stand No S No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No
RFC 3876
Returning Matc
Lightweight Dir 9/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No




"Join" Header 10/1/2004 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3912 WHOIS Protoc 9/1/2004 Draft Standard Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4032
Update to the
Preconditions 3/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4537 Kerberos Crypt 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4568
Session Descri
Security Descr 7/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4574
The Session D
Label Attribute 8/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4680 TLS Handshak 10/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5055 Server-Based 12/1/2007 Proposed Stand No S Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 5238
Datagram Tran
over the Datag 5/1/2008 Proposed Stand No S No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 1692 Transport Multi 8/1/1994
Historic (change
Proposed Stand
March 2006) No T Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No
RFC 2032 RTP Payload F 10/1/1996 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2793 RTP Payload f 5/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3390 Increasing TCP 10/1/2002 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 3517
A Conservativ
(SACK)-based 4/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 4960 Stream Control 9/1/2007 Proposed Stand No T Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 5215 RTP Payload F 8/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes






March 2006) Yes R No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes No No
RFC 3065 Autonomous S 2/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No No
RFC 4486 Subcodes for 4/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes




Aggregation St 9/1/1993 Proposed Stand Yes R No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No
RFC 2439 BGP Route Fla 11/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No No
RFC 4238 Voice Message 10/1/2005 Proposed Stand No R Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2918 Route Refresh 9/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1388 RIP Version 2 1/1/1993 Proposed Stand Yes R No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes
RFC 4203
OSPF Extensio
Multi-Protocol 10/1/2005 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4456
BGP Route Ref
Full Mesh Inter 4/1/2006 Draft Standard Yes R No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes No No
RFC 4781 Graceful Resta 1/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5089
IS-IS Protocol
Element (PCE) 1/1/2008 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5308 Routing IPv6 w 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5329 Traffic Enginee 9/1/2008 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2453 RIP Version 2 11/1/1998 Internet Standar Yes R No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1587 The OSPF NSS 3/1/1994 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5304 IS-IS Cryptogra 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
RFC 3623 Graceful OSPF 11/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 4915 Multi-Topology 6/1/2007 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5301
Dynamic Hostn
Mechanism for 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3107 Carrying Label 5/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
RFC 1184 Telnet Linemo 10/1/1990 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1413 Identification P 2/1/1993 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 1647 TN3270 Enhan 7/1/1994 Proposed Stand Yes A No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1730 Internet Messa 12/1/1994 Proposed Stand Yes A No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1782 TFTP Option E 3/1/1995 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1869 SMTP Service 11/1/1995 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1893 Enhanced Mail 1/1/1996 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1939 Post Office Pro 5/1/1996 Proposed Stand Yes A No No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2045
Multipurpose I
Part One: Form 11/1/1996 Draft Standard Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2068
Hypertext Tran
HTTP/1.1 1/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes A No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2156
MIXER (Mime I
Mapping betwe 1/1/1998 Proposed Stand No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2244 ACAP -- Applic 11/1/1997 Proposed Stand No A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2371 Transaction Int 7/1/1998 Proposed Stand No A No No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2389 Feature negoti 8/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2630 Cryptographic 6/1/1999 Proposed Stand No A No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
Figure D.2: 230 RFCs - Labels and Characteristics (Continued)
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over the Intern 9/1/2002 Proposed Stand No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 3530 Network File S 4/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes A No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
RFC 3730 Extensible Pro 3/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3887 Message Track 9/1/2004 Proposed Stand No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3920 Extensible Mes 10/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3977 Network News 10/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4239 Internet Voice 11/1/2005 Proposed Stand No A No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4314 IMAP4 Access 12/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 4975 The Message S 9/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5023 The Atom Publ 10/1/2007 Proposed Stand No A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1157 Simple Networ 5/1/1990 Proposed Stand Yes C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1256 ICMP Router Di 9/1/1991 Proposed Stand Yes C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1352 SNMP Security 7/1/1992
Historic (Chang
from Proposed
Standard in 200 No C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
RFC 2205
Resource ReS
Functional Spe 9/1/1997 Proposed Stand No C Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2741 Agent Extensib 1/1/2000 Draft Standard Yes C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2748 The COPS (Co 1/1/2000 Proposed Stand No C Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3292 General Switch 6/1/2002 Proposed Stand No C No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3376 Internet Group 10/1/2002 Proposed Stand No C No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3525 Gateway Contr 6/1/2003
Historic (change
from Proposed
Standard) Yes C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4601
Protocol Indep
Protocol Speci 8/1/2006 Proposed Stand No C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 4874
Exclude Route
Protocol-Traffi 4/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1209 The Transmiss 3/1/1991 Internet Standar Yes D No No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1237 Guidelines for 7/1/1991 Proposed Stand No D Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1349 Type of Servic 7/1/1992 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1420 SNMP over IPX 3/1/1993 Proposed Stand Yes D No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1575 An Echo Funct 2/1/1994 Draft Standard No D No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1825 Security Archit 8/1/1995 Proposed Stand No D Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
RFC 1883 Internet Protoc 12/1/1995 Proposed Stand No D No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No
RFC 2002 IP Mobility Sup 1/1/2002 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2474
Definition of th
in the IPv4 and 12/1/1998 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
RFC 3031 Multiprotocol L 1/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes D Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No
RFC 3095
RObust Header
and four profil 7/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes D Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 3775 Mobility Suppo 6/1/2004 Proposed Stand No D No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3931 Layer Two Tun 3/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes D No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3963 Network Mobili 1/1/2005 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4433 Mobile IPv4 Dy 3/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 4945
The Internet IP
IKEv2, and PKI 8/1/2007 Proposed Stand No D Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 1971 IPv6 Stateless 8/1/1996 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2131 Dynamic Host 3/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes S No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2136 Dynamic Updat 4/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
RFC 2165 Service Locati 6/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2651 The Architectu 8/1/1999 Proposed Stand No S No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2848
The PINT Servi
SDP for IP Acc 6/1/2000 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2911 Internet Printin 9/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes S No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3261 SIP: Session In 6/1/2002 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3340 The Applicatio 7/1/2002
Historic (change
from Proposed
Standard) No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3456
Dynamic Host
Configuration 1/1/2003 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3588 Diameter Base 9/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 3596 DNS Extension 10/1/2003 Draft Standard No S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3927 Dynamic Confi 5/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3959
The Early Sess
Protocol (SIP) 12/1/2004 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4120 The Kerberos 7/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes S No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4346 The Transport 4/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4422 Simple Authen 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
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RFC 4430 Kerberized Inte 3/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4555 IKEv2 Mobility 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 4582 The Binary Flo 11/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5189 Middlebox Co 3/1/2008 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5191
Protocol for Ca
(PANA) 5/1/2008 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 5216 The EAP-TLS 3/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 5389 Session Traver 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1323 TCP Extension 5/1/1992 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No
RFC 2581 TCP Congestio 4/1/1999 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 2883
An Extension t
(SACK) Option 7/1/2000 Proposed Stand Yes T No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 3550 RTP: A Transp 7/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes T Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3720 Internet Small 4/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes T Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4340 Datagram Con 3/1/2006 Proposed Stand No T Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2080 RIPng for IPv6 1/1/1997 Proposed Stand No R No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2328 OSPF Version 4/1/1998 Internet Standar Yes R No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5088
OSPF Protocol
Element (PCE) 1/1/2008 Proposed Stand No R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 5305 IS-IS Extension 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 1478 An Architectur 6/1/1993
Historic (change
from Proposed
Standard) No R Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RFC 3219 Telephony Rou 1/1/2002 Proposed Stand No R Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4271 A Border Gate 1/1/2006 Draft Standard Yes R No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1577 Classical IP an 1/1/1994 Proposed Stand No D Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 1731 IMAP4 Authent 12/1/1994 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 1835 Architecture of 8/1/1995
Historic
(Proposed Stan No A No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 1905
Protocol Opera
Network Mana 1/1/1996 Draft Standard No C No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2003 IP Encapsulati 10/1/1996 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
RFC 2163
Using the Inter
Conformant Gl 1/1/1998 Proposed Stand No A Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2207 RSVP Extensio 9/1/1997 Proposed Stand No C No No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 2234 Augmented BN 11/1/1997 Proposed Stand Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2236 Internet Group 11/1/1997 Proposed Stand No C No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2289 A One-Time Pa 2/1/1998 Internet Standar Yes A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 2453 RIP Version 2 11/1/1998 Internet Standar Yes R No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2784 Generic Routin 3/1/2000 Proposed Stand No D Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2486 The Network A 1/1/1999 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 2557
MIME Encapsu
such as HTML 3/1/1999 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2608 Service Locati 6/1/1999 Proposed Stand Yes S No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 2625 IP and ARP ov 6/1/1999 Proposed Stand No D No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 2652
MIME Object D
Common Index 8/1/1999 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes





(Proposed Stan No S Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No No
RFC 2893
Transition Mec
Hosts and Rou 8/1/2000 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 2913 MIME Content 9/1/2000 Proposed Stand No A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3007
Secure Domain
Dynamic Updat 11/1/2000 Proposed Stand No S No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No
RFC 3080 The Blocks Ext 3/1/2001 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3203 DHCP reconfig 12/1/2001 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3380
Internet Printin




The Domain Na 10/1/2002 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No
RFC 3648
Web Distribute
Ordered Collec 12/1/2003 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3659 Extensions to 3/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3910
The SPIRITS (S
Internet Servic 10/1/2004 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 3965 A Simple Mode 12/1/2004 Draft Standard Yes A Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 3981
IRIS: The Inter
Core Protocol 1/1/2005 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4037
Open Pluggabl
Protocol (OCP) 3/1/2005 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes




MPLS Traffic E 6/1/2005 Proposed Stand Yes D No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes No
RFC 4287 The Atom Syn 12/1/2005 Proposed Stand No A Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4302 IP Authenticati 12/1/2005 Proposed Stand No D Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No
RFC 4344
The Secure Sh
Modes 1/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 4448
Encapsulation
over MPLS Net 4/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes D No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes No
RFC 4511
Lightweight Dir
The Protocol 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
RFC 4535
GSAKMP: Gro
Management P 6/1/2006 Proposed Stand No S Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 4607 Source-Specifi 8/1/2006 Proposed Stand No C No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No No
RFC 4644
Network News
Extension for 10/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 4719
Transport of Et
Tunneling Prot 11/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes C No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 4741 NETCONF Con 12/1/2006 Proposed Stand Yes C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No
RFC 4762
Virtual Private
Distribution Pr 1/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes C Yes No No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No No
RFC 4866 Enhanced Rou 5/1/2007 Proposed Stand No D No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes No
RFC 4978 The IMAP COM 8/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes A No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
RFC 5018
Connection Es
Control Protoc 9/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes S No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
RFC 5082 The Generalize 10/1/2007 Proposed Stand Yes D Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 5090 RADIUS Exten 2/1/2008 Proposed Stand No S No No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 5246
The Transport
Version 1.2 8/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes T No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
RFC 5316
ISIS Extension
System (AS) M 12/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No Yes No
RFC 5348
TCP Friendly R
Specification 9/1/2008 Proposed Stand No T Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No
RFC 5357 A Two-Way Act 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand No C Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RFC 5303
Three-Way Han
Adjacencies 10/1/2008 Proposed Stand Yes R No No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No No No Yes
RFC 3748 Extensible Aut 6/1/2004 Proposed Stand Yes S Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
RFC 5386
Better-Than-No
Mode of IPsec 11/1/2008 Proposed Stand No S No No Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
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